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PAYBACK: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS
OF THE CREDIT CARD PROBLEM
Andrea Freeman
The market failure deemed "the credit card problem " is in fact a story of
unprecedented market success. Advanced underwriting technology has facilitated
identification of the most profitable credit card consumer as one who is on the
verge of bankruptcy. The resulting market segmentation represents a massive
upward redistribution of wealth from the poor to wealthy individuals and
corporations. Neoclassical and behavioral economists seek to solve the credit card
problem through increased disclosure and cognitive strategies, focusing
exclusively on consumer rationality. These interventions are incomplete because
the industry's business model relies on the exploitation of "subsistence" credit
card users who have little or no choice in their credit card use. This Article
analyzes the credit card problem through the lens of structural inequality, and
shifts the focus from the consumer to the industry. It proposes amendments to the
CARD Act, including "subsistence amnesty, " the temporary elimination of interest
rates and fees on subsistence purchases made by individuals living in poverty.
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INTRODUCTION
The mortgage and foreclosure crisis that triggered the larger financial
crisis arose through the development of a subprime market, comprised of financial
products designed to capture low-income users and primarily targeted at minority
borrowers.' These predatory lending practices have led to a number of lawsuits
against the loan companies and banks. In December 2011, the Justice Department
reached a $335 million settlement with Bank of America subsidiary Countrywide
Financial Corporation for the company's use of illegal, racially discriminatory
1. Raymond H. Brescia, Subprime Communities: Reverse Redlining, the Fair
Housing Act, and Emerging Issues in Litigation Regarding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2
ALB. Gov'T L. REV. 164, 166-75 (2009); Cecil J. Hunt, In the Racial Crosshairs:
Reconsidering Racially Targeted Predatory Lending Under a New Theory of Economic
Hate Crime, 35 U. TOL. L. REv. 211 (2003).
2. See Brescia, supra note 1, at 166-67. These include a suit brought by the
American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") against Morgan Stanley for discriminatory
lending practices. Press Release, ACLU, Morgan Stanley Sued for Racial Discrimination in
Pushing Predatory Loans to Black Homeowners (Oct. 15, 2012), available at
http://www.aclu.org/racial-justice/morgan-stanley-sued-racial-discrimination-pushing-
predatory-loans-black-homeowners.
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mortgage lending practices.3 Wells Fargo settled a similar suit for over $175
million in July 2012.' These settlements came in the wake of numerous scholarly
articles decrying mortgage lending discrimination.s Legal scholars have also linked
discrimination to subprime markets in the bankruptcy context. One study suggests
that attorneys disproportionately steer African Americans into bankruptcy plans
that are more expensive and carry less favorable terms than other plans.6
The credit card industry has also developed a subprime market for
vulnerable consumers. In 2008, consumer credit card debt reached $972 billion
dollars.7 This came at the end of a decade in which consumer saving was at an all-
time low. Although most economists and legal scholars view the "credit card
problem"9 of excessive consumer debt as one of market failure,o it is in fact a
story of overwhelming market success. Through the use of sophisticated
underwriting technology, the credit card companies learned that consumers who
are on the verge of bankruptcy represent their greatest source of profits." The
industry responded to this information by completely altering its business model.
Instead of seeking customers who would pay off their bills at the end of each
month, known in the industry as convenience users or deadbeats, the companies
began to target low-income consumers who would maintain balances from month
to month, known as revolvers.12
Two seminal Supreme Court decisions paved the way for market
segmentation by allowing banks to charge interest rates and fees based on the laws
3. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Justice Dep't Reaches $335 Million
Settlement to Resolve Allegations of Lending Discrimination by Countrywide Financial
Corporation (Dec. 21, 2011) [hereinafter DOJ Press Release], available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/December/ 11-ag-1694.html.
4. Charlie Savage, Wells Fargo Will Settle Mortgage Bias Charges, N.Y.
TIMES, July 13, 2012, at B3.
5. See, e.g., Brescia, supra note 1; Cassandra Jones Havard, "On the Take":
The Black Box of Credit Scoring and Mortgage Discrimination, 20 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 241
(2011).
6. Jean Braucher et al., Race, Attorney Influence, and Bankruptcy Chapter
Choice, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 393 (2012); see also Tara Siegel Bemard, Blacks Face
Bias in Bankruptcy, Study Suggests, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2012, at Al.
7. Blake Ellis, Credit Card Debt on the Rise, Again, CNNMONEY (Sept. 22,
2011, 7:20 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/09/21/pf/credit_carddebt/index.htm.
8. Personal Saving Rate (PSAVERT), FED. REs. BANK OF ST. LouIS (Jan. 31,
2013, 8:32 AM), http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/PSAVERT/.
9. Oren Bar-Gill describes "the credit card problem" as the fact that "[clredit
card debt. . . is a notoriously prominent component of overall consumer debt and a leading
culprit in consumer bankruptcy cases." Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1373, 1373-74 (2004).
10. Id. at 1379.
11. See Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the "Sweat Box" of Credit
Card Debt, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 375, 385-91.
12. Adam J. Levitin, The Antitrust Super Bowl: America's Payment Systems, No-
Surcharge Rules, and the Hidden Costs of Credit, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 265, 317-18
(2005).
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of the states where they are headquartered, instead of their customers' home states'
laws.' 3 These decisions led banks to move to the most permissive states, and states
to race to deregulate lending to attract the banks' business.
Consequently, low-income consumers now receive credit cards with high
fees and interest rates, while higher-income consumers reap the rewards of credit
card use, such as travel miles and concierge services. Credit card companies target
vulnerable consumers for inferior products through tactics such as teaser rates,
mass mailings of preapproved cards, fee-harvesting cards, overly complex credit
card agreements, and credit-card redlining. As a result of these practices, 80% of
the industry's profits now come from interest payments and late and over-the-limit
fees instead of annual and interchange fees. 14 This shift represents a massive
redistribution of wealth from the poor to wealthier consumers and corporations.
Excessive fees and interest rates can lead to debt spirals and poverty
traps. A debt spiral occurs when a person borrows a small amount but all of her
payments go towards interest and fees, never diminishing the principal. A poverty
trap is when a household or individual lives below a threshold (known as the
Micawber threshold) where it is possible to accumulate enough assets to escape
poverty through saving.1 5 Industry practices that cause debt spirals appear to
create, perpetuate, and exacerbate poverty traps.
Predatory lending practices also contribute to market failure. Neoclassical
market economics assumes that a consumer, presented with a range of available
products, will select the product that best suits her needs.' In attempts to vie for
the consumer's business, sellers cater to these needs. The result of this interplay
between informed consumers and competing sellers is an efficient market
reflecting rational consumer choice based on the availability of products that
13. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996); Marquette Nat'1 Bank
of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
14. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-929, CREDIT CARDS:
INCREASED COMPLEXITY IN RATES AND FEES HEIGHTENS NEED FOR MORE EFFECTIVE
DISCLOSURES TO CONSUMERS 67 (2006) [hereinafter GAO], available at http://gao.gov/
new.items/d06929.pdf.
15. The Micawber threshold was first identified in F.J. Zimmerman and M.R.
Carter, Asset Smoothing, Consumption Smoothing and the Reproduction of Inequality
Under Risk and Subsistence Complaints, 71 1. DEV. ECON. 233 (2003). The concept of the
Micawber threshold, or poverty trap, has also been studied in the context of poverty
experienced in the United States. See, e.g., Steven N. Durlauf, Groups, Social Influences,
and Inequality, in POVERTY TRAPS 141 (Samuel Bowles et al. eds., 2006); Robert J.
Sampson & Jeffrey D. Morenoff, Durable Inequality: Spatial Dynamics, Social Processes,
and the Persistence of Poverty in Chicago Neighborhoods, in POVERTY TRAPS 176 (Samuel
Bowles et al. eds., 2006); Michael E. Sobel, Does the Clustering of Disadvantage "Beget"
Bad Outcomes?, in POVERTY TRAPS 204 (Samuel Bowles et al. eds., 2006) (discussing the
impact of "neighborhood effects" on poverty traps in poor urban communities in the United
States).
16. See Richard A. Epstein, Behavioral Economics: Human Errors and Market
Corrections, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 130-31 (2006).
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provide the consumer with the desired good or service at the acceptable or
affordable price.1
In the credit card industry, behaviors on the part of the consumer and the
seller do not conform to this model.' 8 Instead of seeking to create a product that
matches the consumer's needs, credit card companies attempt to sell the consumer
something undesirable: unmanageable debt.19 Consumers, for their part, often do
not make choices based on a rational assessment of the desirability of the offered
products. Instead, bounded rationality, cognitive mechanisms, and economic and
social realities, all discussed below, inform consumers' actions. 20 In an efficient
market, consumers generally express satisfaction with a product, and sellers'
profits reflect a reasonable margin. In the credit card industry, profits generated
from high interest rates and fees are completely disproportionate to costs and
risks.21 Additionally, many consumers express intense dissatisfaction with their
credit cards. 22
Excessive consumer debt carries high social costs that include illness,
homelessness, and crime. Credit card use also correlates with increasing personal
bankruptcies.23 Even under bankruptcy, some consumers cannot escape the reach
of the credit card companies. In response to extensive lobbying by the industry, the
2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act made discharge
24
of credit card debt more difficult for consumers.
17. See id at 129-31.
18. For more detailed explanations of the inefficiency of the credit card market,
see, for example, Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L.
REv. 1, 7-37 (2008); Ronald J. Mann, "Contracting" for Credit, 104 MICH. L. REv. 899,
899-918 (2006).
19. See John P. Watkins, Corporate Power and the Evolution of Consumer
Credit, 34 J. ECON. ISSUES 909, 921 (2000).
20. See Epstein, supra note 16.
21. For example, Visa offers a credit card where the associated fees exceed the
amount of credit offered. Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA
L. REv. 197, 266 (2008).
22. See Angela Littwin, Beyond Usury: A Study of Credit-Card Use and
Preference Among Low-Income Consumers, 86 TEX. L. REV. 451 (2008)..The Occupy Wall
Street Movement and Bank Transfer Day are other good examples of consumer
dissatisfaction with large banks and credit card practices.
23. See Mann, supra note 11, at 402-03.
24. Credit card companies contributed almost $25 million to politicians and
political parties between 1999 and 2005 in efforts to lobby for bankruptcy reform. Robert H.
Scott III, Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005: How the
Credit Card Industry's Perseverance Paid Off 41 J. ECON. ISSUES 943, 945 (2007). They
succeeded. Thanks to BAPCPA, they now recoup $4 billion a year, representing a 7.5%
increase in revenue. Id. This increase is due to more stringent requirements preventing
people from filing bankruptcy sooner, allowing the credit card companies to collect fees and
interest rates and garnish wages longer. Id. Statistics belie the propaganda supporting the
credit card companies' lobbying campaign that accused consumers of abusing the existing
bankruptcy laws. The most important predictor of personal bankruptcy is children, and 40%
of personal bankruptcies result from medical emergencies. John P. Watkins, Corporate
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Traditional and behavioral economists view the credit card problem as
one of consumer rationality, constrained by either lack of information or cognitive
mechanisms that lead to bounded rationality. Both of these approaches treat credit
card consumers as an undifferentiated group,25 which is problematic because
consumers are not identically situated with respect to financial and social capital.
Traditional economists see the problem as one of lack of information, with
disclosure being the answer. Disclosure is the basis of U.S. financial policy and the
2009 CARD Act. Behavioral economists added to traditional economists' work the
insight that cognitive mechanisms also affect consumer behavior. Their solution to
these cognitive deficiencies is debiasing, which is changing consumers' cognitive
awareness about their purchasing habits.
Disclosure and debiasing, however, are unlikely to have a significant
impact on the "subsistence user." A subsistence user is someone who uses credit
cards to survive, to pay the electricity bill one month and the phone bill the next, or
to purchase essential items such as gas, groceries, or diapers. This type of user
contrasts with the "lifestyle user," who uses credit cards to enhance her lifestyle,
either minimally or considerably. For subsistence users, credit cards offer an
anonymous and dignified manner with which to meet their expenses and allow for
creative financial juggling to avoid the consequences of insolvency, such as
bankruptcy or homelessness. Other sources of credit can be burdensome,
inconvenient, or insufficient. Bank loans usually require collateral. Borrowing
from friends or family members can create significant stress in interpersonal
relationships, particularly as poor people tend to have poor friends and relatives. 27
Using pawnshops to obtain a loan requires that a person own valuable items.
Moreover, pawnshops generally pay out only small amounts. 28 Payday lenders
often charge 200 or 300% interest, and installment purchases increase the price of
goods substantially.29 Most low-income or subsistence users use a combination of
Profits and Personal Misery: Credit, Gender, and the Distribution of Income, 43 J. ECON.
ISSUEs 413, 418-19 (2009); see also Bar-Gill, supra note 9, at 1427 ("Credit issuers are
willing to risk nonpayment because the profits on fimance charges exceed their risks. Thus,
the same industry that seeks customers who will spend more than their means requests that
discharge be denied to these customers because of an implied promise (which courts must
infer) not to spend more than their means." (quoting David F. Snow, The Dischargeability
of Credit Card Debt: New Developments and the Need for a New Direction, 72 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 63, 80-81 (1998))).
25. See, e.g., George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue, "We Can Do This the
Easy Way or the Hard Way ": Negative Emotions, Self-Regulation, and the Law, 73 U. CHI.
L. REv. 183 (2006); Cass R. Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing, 73 U. CHI. L. REv.
249 (2006).
26. See Willis, supra note 21, at 217.
27. Angela Littwin, Testing the Substitution Hypothesis: Would Credit Card
Regulations Force Low-Income Borrowers into Less Desirable Lending Alternatives?, 2009
U. ILL. L. REv. 403, 460.
28. Id. at 437.
29. See id. at 436; Nathalie Martin, 1,000% lnterest-Good While Supplies Last:
A Study ofPayday Loan Practices and Solutions, 52 ARIZ. L. REv. 563, 564 (2010).
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all of these types of borrowing to get by, and many identify credit cards as the
most pernicious. 30
Nonetheless, subsistence users need access to credit cards because they
have evolved into an essential part of modem life. They are necessary to rent a car,
stay in a hotel, or gain access to inexpensive entertainment, such as DVD rentals.
Commercial airlines require credit cards to purchase tickets, check in at airports,
buy food on planes, and use luggage carts. Most importantly, with a small or
nonexistent social safety net in place for families in need, credit cards become
indispensable in the event of medical emergencies, car accidents, and other
unforeseen crises. Credit cards act as a form of insurance, social security, and
status symbol. Without them, individuals may fall into an underclass, shut out
from many mainstream activities.
A structural analysis of the credit card problem shifts the focus from the
consumer to the industry, closely examining the range of tactics the credit card
companies use to take advantage of the restricted choices of financially distressed
consumers.3 1 Structural inequality-inequality embedded in and created by the
social structures that dictate individuals' positions in relation to others-makes
some individuals and communities more vulnerable to financial exploitation,
particularly during periods of widespread economic depression or recession. 32
Vulnerability arises from class position and race, in addition to gender, sexual
orientation, physical ability, immigration status, and other dimensions of power
and identity. Predatory practices and illegal discrimination create and perpetuate
these vulnerabilities. 33 Credit card companies, like most public corporations, seek
30. See Littwin, supra note 27, at 433-44.
31. The work of other legal scholars on the credit card problem is incomplete
because it does not apply the framework of a structural inequality analysis. Ronald J. Mann,
Oren Bar-Gill, and Adam Levitin concentrate primarily on the effects of contractual and
cognitive deficiencies on credit card use. See, e.g., Mann, supra note 18, at 899-919; Bar-
Gill, supra note 9; Adam J. Levitin, Priceless? The Social Costs of Credit Card Merchant
Restraints, 45 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (2008). Elizabeth Warren's work focuses almost
exclusively on the middle class, even though low-income credit card users carry the greatest
amounts of debt and pay the highest interest rates and fees. See, e.g., TERESA A. SULLIVAN,
ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS 115
(2000); Kimberly Palmer, Elizabeth Warren: Middle Class Lacks Security, US NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Feb. 9, 2009), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/alpha-consumer/2009/
02/09/warren-middle-class-lacks-security; Elizabeth Warren, America Without a Middle
Class, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 3, 2009, 10:00 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
elizabeth-warren/america-without-a-middle b 377829.html.
32. See, e.g., IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE
(1990); MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990s (2d ed. 1994); Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry: A Market
Lock-in Model ofDiscrimination, 86 VA. L. REv. 727 (2000).
33. Two studies document illegal, racially discriminatory practices in the credit
card industry. Ethan Cohen-Cole, Credit Card Redlining (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos.,
Working Paper No. QAU08-1, 2008), available at http://www.bostonfed.org/bankinfo/qaul
wp/2008/qauO801.pdf; Chi-Jack Lin, Racial Discrimination in the Consumer Credit Market
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above all to maximize their profits. This narrow focus is uniquely harmful in the
context of credit cards because of the great need for credit by the most vulnerable
members of society and the lack of both meaningful regulation of and competition
in the industry. 34
This Article examines how systemic and institutionalized social
conditions eliminate consumer choice in the use of credit, and the ways in which
the credit card companies' targeting of socially and financially vulnerable
consumers for subprime products serves to entrench those conditions. The Article
proposes amendments to the Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility, and
Disclosure Act ("CARD Act")." Although the CARD Act prohibited some of the
credit card companies' most egregious practices, it also afforded them substantial
opportunities to make up for any losses associated with these changes through
other means, such as additional fees imposed on cards intended for low-income
consumers.3 6 These loopholes made possible the increase in consumer debt that
occurred after the legislation's enactment.3 7
The next iteration of the CARD Act should impose reporting
requirements on the credit card industry. These disclosures could facilitate the
reinstatement of federal usury laws, which cap the amount of interest a lender can
charge. Increased transparency about the source of the industry's profits and
market segmentation would also assist in crafting regulation of exploitative
practices and products. Additionally, to strengthen the financial status of
communities targeted by the industry's practices, the CARD Act should require
credit card-issuing banks to assist low-income consumers by creating asset-based
savings programs. These programs inure substantial benefits to consumers and
corporations alike by increasing the number of banked consumers and facilitating
saving that can lead to class mobility.
Finally, the CARD Act should implement a "subsistence amnesty,"
temporarily eliminating interest and fees on subsistence purchases made with
credit cards by individuals living under the poverty line. This provision would
compel the credit card companies to adjust their business model, refocusing their
ii (2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The Ohio State University), available at
http://etd.ohiolink.edu/send-pdf.cgi/Lin%20ChiJack.pdf?osul276708518.
34. See Watkins, supra note 24, at 414 ("Consumer credit is the lever that
transforms consumer assets into corporate profits.").
35. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009,sec.
101, § 127, 123 Stat. 1734, 1735-36 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1637 (2012)) [hereinafter
CARD Act].
36. One example of such a card is First Premier's Platinum card, aimed at low-
income consumers, which offers an interest rate of 36% and comes with a $400 annual fee.
Blake Ellis, First Premier's $400-a-Year Credit Card, CNNMONEY (February 11, 2012,
9:37 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/02/09/pf/first_premier creditcard/index.htm?
source-cnnbin; see also Andrew R. Johnson, Credit-Card Issuers Circling Subprime
Borrowers Again, MARKETWATCH (Oct. 11, 2011, 3:11 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/
story/card-issuers-circling-subprime-borrowers-again-2011-10-11.
37. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Consumer Credit -
G.19 (Dec. 2012), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/gl9/Current/.
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attention on wealthier consumers as sources of profit. It would also restore some of
the exploitative profits derived from predatory practices to low-income consumers,
allowing some of them to begin paying off the principal of their debts and
eventually to emerge from debt spirals or poverty traps.
Part I provides an overview of the credit card industry and describes the
companies' predatory practices. Part II sets out the neoclassical and behavioral
economists' analyses of and remedies for the credit card problem. Part III analyzes
this problem through the lens of structural inequality and proposes four
amendments to the CARD Act. The Article concludes with a call for future work
in this area by scholars in law and economics and behavioral economics to include
an analysis of structural inequalities.
I. THE CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY
A. History and Structure of the Industry
The first plastic cards allowing consumers to buy now and pay later were
charge cards associated with specific retail stores that appeared in the early
twentieth century. Diners Club introduced the first universal credit card in
1949.39 The card allowed traveling businessmen to charge meals at a variety of
restaurants and required payment in full each month.40 Other cards soon entered
the market, despite doubts that a credit card system could be profitable. 4 1 From the
1960s to the 1980s, buoyed by congressional and judicial support of deregulation,
Bank of America and a rival network, the Interbank Card Association, became the
two major credit card players, offering cards that they would eventually brand as
Visa and MasterCard, respectively. 42
The credit card game changed radically in 1978 when, in Marquette
National Bank of Minneapolis v. First Omaha Service Corp.,43 the Supreme Court
ruled that national banks could charge interest rates according to the usury ceilings
in the state where their headquarters were located, instead of their customers'
home states.44 This decision led most national banks to relocate to the states with
the most permissive usury laws and led states to repeal restrictive laws to
discourage the exodus of major financial institutions. 45 A second Supreme Court
decision, Smiley v. Citibank,4 6 extended this rule to fees in 1996, thereby
38. See Johnna Montgomerie, The Financialization of the American Credit Card
Industry, 10 COMPETITION & CHANGE 301, 309-10 (2006).
39. Id at 302.
40. RONALD I. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF
PAYMENT CARD MARKETS 81-82 (2006).
41. See ROBERT D. MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION: THE CONSEQUENCES OF
AMERICA'S ADDICTION TO CREDIT 85-86 (2000).
42. Id. The original cards were called Master Charge and BankAmericard.
43. 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
44. Id. at 308-12.
45. Bar-Gill, supra note 9, at 1381-82.
46. 517 U.S. 735 (1996).
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completing the process of deregulation.4 7 Later, securitization, the practice of
selling parcels of credit card debt to investors, freed banks from reliance on their
deposit pools to replenish capital available for lending to credit card consumers
and led to global expansion of the industry. 48
Initially, the lifestyle user was the paradigmatic credit card holder.49
Cultivating this type of consumer required a change in values surrounding credit.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the use of credit was considered
"an economic sin" that led "straight to serfdom" by setting "utterly false standards
of living" and causing "hopelessly distorted" judgment.50 Industrialization
refocused the societal emphasis on production to consumption through
urbanization, rising incomes, and the abundance of new goods.5i By the 1920s, it
became "old-fashioned to limit . .. purchases to the amount of . .. cash balances,"
with consumers using credit to finance up to 90% of their durable goods
52purchases.
Early credit cards attracted many lifestyle users, most of whom paid their
balances in full, leading to the imposition of annual fees on cards in the 1970s.53
Over the next few decades, technological advances altering social interactions
created a new lifestyle user. As Juliet Schor explains in The Overspent American,
most modem Americans no longer strive to emulate their neighbors.54 Instead,
they now seek to attain a quality of life manifested through materialist acquisition
and overt consumption that matches that flaunted by celebrities, television and film
characters, and co-workers.5 5 The present-day leisure class transmits its taste and
values to "the 99%" primarily through fictional families, and studies reveal that
most people report dissatisfaction with their class status, regardless of what it is. 56
In the 1970s, the National Welfare Rights Organization led a successful
grassroots campaign to democratize credit by extending it to women on welfare.5 7
47. See id. at 744-47.
48. Montgomerie, supra note 38, at 302-03, 308.
49. A lifestyle user is a consumer who uses credit cards, not to survive, but to
enhance her lifestyle, either to a small or great degree.
50. Watkins, supra note 19, at 913 (quoting CLYDE WILLIAM PHELPS, THE ROLE
OF THE SALES FINANCE COMPANIES IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 39 (1952)).
51. Id. at 913-14.
52. Id. at 915 (quoting FREDERICK ALLEN, ONLY YESTERDAY: AN INFORMAL
HISTORY OF THE 1920's (1931)).
53. Id. at 922.
54. JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERSPENT AMERICAN: UPSCALING, DOwNSHIFTING,
AND THE NEW CONSUMER 3-4 (1998).
55. Id. at 5, 28-34.
56. Id. at 7-8, 11-19. Compounding the harmful effects of ubiquitous images of
an idealized and unattainable lifestyle on non-wealthy lifestyle users are various
psychological mechanisms that inhibit the rational use of credit.
57. Regina Austin, Of Predatory Lending and the Democratization of Credit:
Preserving the Social Safety Net of Informality in Small-Loan Transactions, 53 AM. U. L.
REV. 1217, 1253-54 (2004) (citing Felicia Kornbluh, Black Buying Power: Welfare Rights,
Consumerism, and Northern Protest, in FREEDOM NORTH: BLACK FREEDOM STRUGGLES
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Activists in the movement viewed the possession of a credit card as a status
symbol, the absence of which relegated individuals to second-class citizenship.
Middle- and low-income convenience users (who do not pay interest or fees) were
the primary beneficiaries of the credit democratization movement. 59 The expansion
of credit card lending continued to the point where, in 2006, 80% of households
possessed at least one credit card.o
Underwriting technology, introduced in the 1990s, allows lenders to
develop complex statistical models to predict spending and repayment behavior for
increasingly smaller sections of the population.6 1 Based on these models, lenders
can amass portfolios of cardholders previously considered too risky. This leads to
new profits generated from low-income consumers' need to revolve balances. 62
Many of these cardholders are subsistence users, who are initially attracted to
credit cards' salient benefits but ultimately incur more harm than good from their
use.63
Presently, the credit card industry is the most profitable financial service
in the United States.6 The average credit card interest rate of 20% is "significant
higher than the prime lending rate and three times that of a home mortgage."
Credit card issuers earn roughly 80% of their profits from interest rates and penalty
fees.6 6 Initially, the credit card business model focused on attracting low-risk,
OUTSIDE THE SOUTH, 1940-1980, at 199, 199 (Jeanne Theoharis & Komozi Woodward eds.,
2003)).
58. Id. at 1254. Middle- and upper-class women also viewed the lack of access to
credit cards as a symbol of discrimination. Neither the mayor of Davenport, Iowa, Kathryn
Kirshbaum, nor tennis star Billie Jean King could get credit cards without their husbands'
signatures until Congress passed the Depository Institutions Amendments Act banning sex
discrimination in lending in 1974. GAIL COLLINS, WHEN EVERYTHING CHANGED 250 (2009).
The idea that possession of a credit card confers privilege that can overcome class or racial
discrimination is still prevalent today. See Littwin, supra note 22, at 465-66. One example
of this is the introduction of gold, platinum, and executive cards. Marketing and advertising
campaigns appeal to this desire for upward class mobility although their practices make
mobility far less likely. For a thorough and fascinating account of shifting marketing
strategies and descriptions of the representative ads, see MANN[NG, supra note 41, at 1-30.
59. Steven Mercatante, The Deregulation of Usury Ceilings, Rise ofEasy Credit,
and Increasing Consumer Debt, 53 S.D. L. REv. 37, 43-44 (2008).
60. Fast Facts About Credit Card Debt, ABC NEWS (Jan. 2, 2006), http://abc
news.go.com/WNT/Business/story?id=1457162#.UOsJCKX4ZUR.
61. Ronald J. Mann, Patterns of Credit Card Use Among Low and Moderate
Income Households, in INSUFFICIENT FUNDS: SAvINGS, ASSETS, CREDIT, AND BANKING
AMONG Low-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 252, 257 (Rebecca M. Blank & Michael S. Barr eds.,
2009), available athttp://www.columbia.edu/~mr2651/CreditCardsforthePoor.pdf.
62. Id
63. A subsistence user is a consumer who relies on credit cards to pay for the
basics of her existence. While subsistence users are almost always low-income users, not all
low-income users are subsistence users.
64. Montgomerie, supra note 38, at 301-02.
65. Mercatante, supra note 59, at 50.
66. GAO, supra note 14, at 67. These profits represent a significant shift in
consumer attitudes toward debt from a financial mechanism of last resort to a necessary
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convenience users whose transactions would generate merchant fees.67 Now, the
ideal credit card user maintains only enough financial stability to avoid bankruptcy
proceedings.6 8 The credit card companies' ability to induce this type of
dependence is a testament in part to successful advertising and marketing.
The credit card industry divides consumers into four classifications:
nonusers, convenience users (or deadbeats), revolvers, or late payers.70 A nonuser
is someone who does not use credit cards. A convenience user is a consumer who
pays off monthly balances in a timely fashion. A revolver is a credit card holder
who carries a balance over from month to month. A late payer is someone who
pays off the monthly balance, but not before the due date.
The four major credit card brands in the United States are Visa,
MasterCard, American Express, and Discover.7 Visa and MasterCard set
interchange fees with merchants that intermediaries, called acquirers, collect for a
small percentage of the interchange fee. 72 Dominating the industry, these two
component of modem daily life. See also Watkins, supra note 24, at 414 ("Consumer credit
is the lever that transforms consumer assets into corporate profits." (citation omitted)).
67. MANN, supra note 40, at 81-83. In January 2013, merchants and the major
credit card companies settled an ongoing suit. The settlement terms allow merchants to
impose a surcharge on consumers for credit card use. This surcharge will likely decrease the
potential for profits from transactions and focus the companies even more on fees and
interest rates as their main profit sources.
68. See Mann, supra note 11, at 385-92. Merchant fees markedly decreased as a
source of profit for credit card companies after the Federal Reserve implemented a cap on
these fees, beginning in October 2011, of 21 to 24 cents, down from an average of 44 cents
per transaction. Edward Wyatt, Retailers Push Fed for Yet Lower Debit Fees, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 24, 2011, at Bl.
69. "Selling consumer credit is, of course, selling debt-a commodity that would
generally be an undesirable one as far as the buyer is concerned. The techniques of selling
debt today, however, are such that the nature of the commodity for sale is concealed from
the buyer." Watkins, supra note 19, at 921 (quoting Arch W. Troelstrup, The Influence of
Moral and Social Responsibility on Selling Consumer Credit, 51 Am. ECON. REv. 549, 550
(1961)).
70. JENNIFER WHEARY & TAMARA DRAUT, WHO PAYS? THE WINNERS AND
LOSERS OF CREDIT CARD DEREGULATION 4-6 (2007), available at http://www.demos.org/
sites/default/files/publications/whopaysDemos.pdf.
71. See Eva Norlyk Smith, The Major Credit Card Companies,
CREDITCARDGUIDE (May 22, 2009), http://www.creditcardguide.com/creditcards/credit-
cards-general/major-credit-card-companies. In 2006, Visa had 44% of the market,
MasterCard had 31%, American Express had 20%, and Discover had 5%. Q&A: More
About Visa's Foray into the Stock Market, USA TODAY (Feb. 25, 2008, 6:19 PM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/retail/2008-02-25-visa-ipo-qaN.htm.
72. See Zhu Wang, Market Structure and Credit Card Pricing: What Drives the
Interchange? 3 n.6 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Kan. City, Payments Sys. Research, Working
Paper No. PSR WP 06-04, 2007), available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/news/
CONFEREN/08payments/08payments Wang.pdf; see also Ann Kjos, The Merchant-
Acquiring Side of the Payment Card Industry: Structure, Operations, and Challenges 2-3,
20 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila. Payment Cards Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 07-12, 2007),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1031519.
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brands have a network of issuers that set card prices and terms. Banks in the
network also issue funds. Other issuers, such as Capital One, known as monolines,
perform no functions other than issuing cards.74 American Express traditionally
did not operate through issuers. Instead, it relied on high annual fees paid by
wealthy consumers for the privilege of the status, perks, and rewards enjoyed by
members.7 5 In 2004, however, American Express changed its business model, and
MBNA became the first issuer to offer an American Express card, followed by
Citigroup and a host of others. 76 Five credit card issuers (Chase, Bank of America,
Citi, American Express, and Capital One) dominate the issuer industry, and the
top nine issuers hold approximately 90% of the existing credit card balances.
Despite the existence of hundreds of issuers and several hundreds of
distinct credit card products, the credit card market is noncompetitive for low-
income users, who uniformly receive offers of cards with disadvantageous terms. 79
Credit cards universally come with high interest rates and fees, which can be
avoided through monthly payments in full by solvent consumers. The credit card
companies profit from these users through transaction fees and fees associated
with high-status cards that offer perks.so
Credit cards perform two separate functions: transacting and lending.
Although there are costs associated with transacting, merchants primarily bear
these costs. Credit card companies pay merchants only 97 to 99% of the amount
charged, depending on the type of card or the particular agreement between the
individual merchant and company.8' In some states, merchants may attach a
surcharge to credit card use to shift this cost to the consumer.82
73. Wang, supra note 72, at 3 & nn.2, 6 (stating that Visa and MasterCard
handle approximately 80% of all U.S. credit card transactions).
74. See Ronald J. Mann, Credit Cards and Debit Cards in the United States and
Japan, 55 VAND. L. REv. 1055, 1068 (2002).
75. See Douglas Akers et al., Overview of Recent Developments in the Credit
Card Industry, FDIC BANKING REv. (Nov. 17, 2005), http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analyticall
banking/2005nov/article2.html#33.
76. See id.
77. In 2009, the top five issuers held $450 billion in consumer debt. U.S.
General Purpose Cards-Midyear 2011, NILSON REP., Aug. 2011, at 1, 7.
78. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, BUILDING THE CFPB 12 (2011)
[hereinafter CFPB Report], available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2011/07/Report BuildingTheCfpbl.pdf.; NILSoN REP., Aug. 2009, at 9.
79. Research assistants have searched tirelessly for a "good" card to recommend
to concerned consumers, in vain.
80. These cards include the American Express Black and Centurion cards.
81. See Wang, supra note 72, at 1-3. Rewards cards cost merchants more than
regular cards, but merchants do not pass these costs back to the individual consumer. In
November 2011, the Federal Reserve capped the amount of interchange fees credit card
companies could collect from merchants, leading the companies to pursue other profit
avenues that will likely include vulnerable consumers. See Wyatt, supra note 68.
82. See Atossa Araxia Abrahamian, Retailers May Add Surcharge in Credit
Card Transactions, REUTERS (Jan 28, 2013, 5:31 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/
01/28/us-creditcard-settlement-fees-idUSBRE9OR14U20130128; Reuters, Retailers May
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Credit cards compete with other payment methods, including cash;
checks; debit cards; consumer-to-consumer ("C2C") payments, such as PayPal;
and mobile payments. Cash, which once represented the most honest and ethical
form of payment, now carries a stigma of association with criminality and
poverty.8 The use of checks, though low in comparison to credit cards and debit
cards, is considerable in light of the associated expenses and inconvenience.85
Checks once offered consumers the opportunity to make purchases and delay
payment until payday or other influxes of income in the near future, but new rules
eliminated this advantage by requiring almost immediate payment by the bank
upon which a check is drawn.86 It is therefore likely that check use will decline
dramatically in the United States, in line with international trends.
In many countries, debit cards are more popular than credit cards because
of their low transaction costs (money transfers directly from the customer's
Add Surcharges on Credit-Card Purchases, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 28, 2013),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-01-28/business/chi-retaiers-may-addl-surcharges-
on-creditcard-purchases-20130128_1_debit-card-payments-credit-card-surcharges.
83. Visa has created a mobile payment system for use via cell phone in
developing countries, beginning in Nigeria and Uganda, that allows consumers to conduct
financial transactions without having to travel long distances to financial services
institutions' physical locations. Jenna Wortham, Visa to Offer Mobile Payments in
Developing Nations, N.Y. TIMEs BITS BLOG (Nov. 16, 2011, 10:00 PM),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/16/visa-to-offer-mobile-payments-in-developing-
nations/.
84. In terms of social value, cash is now often perceived as "the least
sophisticated, least efficient, and least productive form of money."
When we think of cash, we envision small amounts of money that will fit
into a wallet, a cookie jar, the opening in a mattress, or a passbook
savings account. When we think of cash in large amounts, we envision
stacks of bills that have been illegally obtained or accumulated in the
criminal or underground economies and that must be laundered or
destigmatized. Cash is meant to be spent or saved; it is largely a tool of
consumption, not an instrument of investment.
Austin, supra note 57, at 1245.
85. MANN, supra note 40, at 13. The federal government, however, has decided
to go paperless. Since May 2011, social security and welfare recipients have received their
benefits either through electronic deposit into a bank account or through a debit card.
Christine Hauser, As Benefits Go Paperless, Check-Day Rituals Vanish, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
29, 2011, at Bl. The new policy is intended to reduce theft and will save the government
$120 million a year in costs associated with the use of checks. Id.
86. See Linda R. Crane, Checking Out of the Exception to UCC 3-104: Why
Parties Should Be Able to Negotiate Whether (or Not) Their Checks Are Payable on
Demand, 3 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 73 (2013).
87. Susan Herbst-Murphy, Trends and Preferences in Consumer Payments:
Lessons from the Visa Payment Panel Study, FED. REs. BANK PHILADELPHIA, 9, 11 (May
2010), available at https://www.philadelphiafed.org/consumer-credit-and-payments/
payment-cards-center/publications/discussion-papers/2010/D-2010-Visa-Payment-Panel-
Study.pdf.
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account to the merchant) and disciplinary effect.88 Consumers cannot borrow
money using a debit card. Therefore, although ease of use may lead a consumer to
spend more using a debit card than she would making a cash or check purchase,
debit cards are less likely to lead to financial distress. In the United States, Visa
and MasterCard dominate the debit, as well as the credit card, market and
deliberately create consumer confusion between the two types of cards. 90 Most
MasterCard and Visa cards function as either a debit or a credit card, but because
of the higher profits associated with credit card use, companies encourage
consumers to use credit cards through rewards programs and similar perks.91
Payment systems, such as PayPal92 and mobile payments through
smartphones,93 are emerging threats to credit cards because these new payment
88. See MANN, supra note 40, at 106. For example, the card markets of Australia,
Canada, and the United Kingdom are dominated by the use of payment cards but with
substantially lower use of credit cards and credit card borrowing than the United States,
likely due to increased segmentation between debit and credit card products. Id.
89. Id. at 28-29, 119-20.
90. See id. at 32-33; MANNING, supra note 41, at 115 (explaining how the
banking industry has attached automatic lines of credit to debit cards to erode "the
traditional 'cognitive connect"' between debit cards and bank accounts). Although
American Express and Discover have traditionally not offered debit cards, American
Express recently announced the introduction of a prepaid debit card. American Express
Unveils a 'Simple'Prepaid Debit Card, CONSUMERREPORTS.ORG (June 15, 2011, 1:00 PM),
http://news.consumerreports.org/money/2011/06/american-express-unveils-first-no-fee-
prepaid-debit-card.html. Unfortunately, all prepaid debit cards are exempt from federal
consumer protection laws that cover the consumer in cases involving fraudulent or
erroneous charges. Id. Another burden for the consumer using an American Express prepaid
debit card is the fact that putting cash on the card requires you to "purchase" a MoneyPack
at a retailer like Wal-Mart, at costs of up to $4.95 per transaction. Frequently Asked
Questions: All You Need to Know About the American Express Prepaid Card, AM. ExPRESS,
https://www212.americanexpress.com/dsmlive/dsm/dom/us/en/personal/cardmember/additi
onalproductsandservices/gificardsandtravelerscheques/gprfaqs.do?vgnextoid=0f6293eebf 3
ec2lOVgnVCM200000dOfaad94RCRD&vgnextchannel=95ddb81e8482al 1OVgnVCM1000
00defaad94RCRD&appInstanceName=default&name=gpr_faqs&type=intbenefitdetail#faq
AddMoney (last visited July 24, 2011). So when the American Express prepaid card user
wants to put $40.00 cash on their card the cost of doing so results in an actual balance of
$35.05.
91. See Ann Carms, Cash-Back Credit Card Rewards Offers Going Strong, N.Y.
TIMES BUCKS BLOG (Feb. 15, 2012, 10:35 AM), http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/
15/cash-back-credit-card-rewards-offers-going-strong/?scp=4&sq=credit%20cards&st-cse.
92. For an explanation of how PayPal operates and some of the legal issues
surrounding it, see Andrds Guadamuz GonzAlez, PayPal: The Legal Status of C2C Payment
Systems, 20 COMPUTER L. & SEC. REV. 293 (2004).
93. See, e.g., Maria Aspan & Sinead Carew, Telco Payment Venture Targets
Visa and MasterCard, REUTERS (Nov. 16, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSTRE6AF3FA20101116; Michael Finney, Mobile Payments May Soon Make Debit
Cards Obsolete, ABC7 NEWS (Nov. 23, 2010), http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=
news/7_on_your side&id=7806909; Andrew Munchbach, Official: AT&T, T-Mobile,
Verizon to Launch Mobile Commerce Network, BGR (Nov. 16, 2010), http://www.bgr.com/
2010/11/16/official-att-t-mobile-verizon-launch-isis-mobile-commerce-network/; Laurie
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methods are easier and cheaper to use for consumers who have access to the
required technology. In November 2010, three of the four top mobile phone
providers (AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile) announced that they had established a
joint venture for mobile payments that allows consumers to pay for items simply
by waving a smartphone near a machine. 94 This joint venture, called Isis, partnered
with all four of the major credit card companies.95 Sprint created a mobile payment
system in partnership with American Express, 96 and Google developed a similar
technology in conjunction with MasterCard.9 7 In Europe, iCarte partnered with
Visa for contactless payments via the iPhone.98 PayPal competes with the domestic
ventures by offering in-store payments through mobile devices that do not rely on
credit cards. 99
Eventually, for high-technology consumers, these innovations will lead to
the elimination of wallets and credit cards, which will then become the province of
the lower-income, less technologically advanced consumer. Under these
circumstances, exploitation of the power imbalance between corporation and low-
income consumer will likely increase.
B. Predatory Industry Practices
The credit card companies engage in a number of tactics designed to
capture vulnerable consumers, and to extract the maximum amount of interest and
fee payments from them. One practice that negatively affects a range of users is
the offering of teaser rates, or very low introductory interest rates (often zero), that
increase exponentially after a short period, usually six months. 00 The teaser
strategy is a very successful marketing tool. Studies show that an appealing
introductory interest rate is the most important factor in credit card selection for
Segall, Your Mobile Phone is Becoming Your Wallet, CNNMONEY.COM (Jan. 19, 2011, 9:14
AM), http://moncy.cnn.com/2011/01/19/technology/mobile_payments/index.htm?hpt-T2;
Christine Speer, Meet the People Who're Making Your Credit Card Obsolete,
PHILLYMAG.COM (Dec. 2010), http://www.phillymag.com/articles/pulse-chattermeet-the
people whore_makingyour credit card obsolete/.
94. Aspan & Carew, supra note 93.
95. Mark Hachman, Isis Carrier Venture Signs Payment Deals with Visa,
MasterCard, Others, PCMAG.COM (July 19, 2011), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/
0,2817,2388712,00.asp.
96. Id
97. See Google Wallet Goes Live, More Consumer-Friendly Version to Follow,
UNIBUL CREDIT CARD BLOG (Sept. 21, 2011, 10:52 AM), http://blog.unibul
merchantservices.com/google-wallet-goes-live-more-consumer-friendly-version-to-follow.
98. Charlie Sorrel, Europeans Already Using iPhones for Payments, WIRED
(Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2011/02/europeans-already-using-iphones-
for-payments/#.
99. Matt Hamblen, PayPal Unveils Mobile Payments for In-Store Shopping,
COMPUTERWORLD (Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9220048/
PayPal unveils_mobile_paymentsforinstore shopping.
100. Bar-Gill, supra note 9, at 1392-93.
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one-third of consumers.' 0 Most of these consumers borrow, however, at the higher
post-promotion rates.102
Teaser rates are a clear example of a marketing strategy called shrouding
designed to exploit consumers' preference for short-term gains over long ones and
their often misguided optimism about their financial management skills and
opportunities.'0 3 These rates also appeal to customers who need credit quickly and
cannot pay off their balances within six months due to financial instability.
Exponential increases in interest rates after six months exemplify the lack of
relationship between the rates and the issuers' true costs.
Another industry trick is the mass mailing of preapproved cards,
frequently to people in low-income areas. These consumers often believe that they
are not eligible for credit cards due to low credit scores or failed attempts to
acquire cards through the regular application process.'1" Preapproved cards are
hard to resist, particularly for people who live in areas without banks, lack easy
access to transportation, are too consumed with work and childcare responsibilities
to venture outside the home to obtain a card, do not believe they are eligible for a
credit card, or simply have urgent financial needs. The cards usually come with
very high interest rates and fees for default, late payments, and over-the-limit
charges. 0 5 Mass mailings of preapproved cards generate two-thirds of all new
credit card accounts. 106
The fee-harvesting card is another product that exploits consumers'
urgent needs for credit and their short-term thinking. This type of card, available
from many issuers, disguises its effective rates by attaching fees to its use that
dwarf the credit it provides.' 0 7 For example, one Visa card with a $300 credit limit
has a $79 application fee, with an additional $281 fee attaching to the card upon
approval. 0 8
Consumers may not even realize that the card they have purchased is a
fee-harvesting one. Credit card agreements are notoriously difficult to read and
interpret.109 They are voluminous, written in small print, and frequently consist of
101. Id. at 1392.
102. Id.
103. Shrouding is the process by which "merchants identify a myopic class of
customers and exploit the[ir] lack of rationality by systematically backloading the less
attractive terms into a less prominent time and place in the relationship." MANN, supra note
40, at 136 (citing Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia,
and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. ECON. 505 (2006)).
104. See Littwin, supra note 22, at 475.
105. Id. at 453.
106. Id. at 484.
107. Willis, supra note 21, at 265-66; see NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER,
FEE-HARVESTERS: LoW-CREDIT, HIGH-COST CARDS BLEED CONSUMERS 5-6 (2007),
available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/report-fee-harvester.pdf.
108. Willis, supra note 21, at 266. For more specific examples of fee-harvesting
cards, see Mann, supra note 61, at 257, 262.
109. Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN.
L. & POL'Y REV. 233, 234, 249-50 (2002).
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different parts mailed to consumers at different times. Most agreements do not
arrive until after a consumer acquires and begins to use the card.'1 o Consumers
likely do not consider the agreement terms to be negotiable and, even if they
wished to negotiate them, would not be able to identify the proper person with
whom to do so."' Additionally, most agreements state that companies may change
interest rates at any time for any reason without providing advance warnings or
recourse to the consumer." 2
Racial discrimination is another predatory practice in which credit card
companies engage to increase their profits. Studies demonstrate that credit card
companies discriminate based on race during face-to-face encounters with walk-in
customers and through assumptions arising from an applicant's name, voice, or zip
code. In 2008, the Boston Federal Reserve Bank published Credit Card Redlining,
a study by Ethan Cohen-Cole comparing the terms and availability of credit card
agreements entered into by credit card owners with identical risk profiles and
payment histories living in different areas.113 The study reveals significant
differences in access to credit and the amount of credit offered based on the racial
makeup of the users' neighborhoods.1 4 For example, the difference in available
credit in neighborhoods with a population that is at least 80% African American as
compared to neighborhoods that are at least 80% white, all other factors being
equal, is more than $7,000."s
A 2010 study by Chi-Jack Lin also reports significant racial
discrimination in the consumer credit card market." 6 The study shows that,
accounting for all alternative explanations, the fact that a consumer is African
American negatively affects the probability of owning a credit card, the number of
cards owned, and the average credit line per card. Using multiple regressions, the
study demonstrates that companies deny some credit card applications from
African Americans solely based on race. '1 African-American credit card
applicants benefit more from owning a house than white applicants, and from
ownin a car, having a job, earning a higher income, and possessing a greater net
worth. 1 These statistics indicate that while whiteness serves as a proxy for
creditworthiness, African-American applicants must concretely demonstrate their
110. Id. at 249-50; see also Mann, supra note 18.
ill. Mann, supra note 18, at 905.
112. Id. at 908.
113. See Cohen-Cole, supra note 33.
114. Id. at 14-15.
115. Id.
116. Lin, supra note 33. This study appears to be the first of its kind, and highly
accurate due to the use of multiple regressions. However, a 1980 attempt to establish a
prima facie case of racial discrimination based on redlining against the issuer of a gasoline
credit card company failed in part due to the complexity of the credit grading system and
the lack of information about the common characteristics of the hypothesized applicant pool
in the plaintiffs zip code. Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co., 490 F. Supp. 1026, 1030-31 (N.D. Ga.
1980).
117. Lin, supra note 33, at 45.
118. Id. at 48.
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ability to repay debt. The study also documents that Latinos receive cards with less
favorable conditions than whites.119
II. NEOCLASSICAL AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMISTS' ANALYSES
AND SOLUTIONS
A. Neoclassical Economists
Neoclassical economic analysis, which forms the cornerstone of
American credit card policy, attributes the inefficient functioning of the credit card
market to consumers' lack of information.120 Under this framework, the prescribed
response to this dearth of information is increased disclosure by credit card
companies.121 According to neoclassical economics theory, sellers compete to
provide optimal goods to rational consumers. Because consumers are perfectly
rational, markets only fail when buyers lack complete information.122 U.S.
financial policy fully embraces this market theory, such that the cornerstone of
credit card regulation is disclosure.123 Accordingly, the aptly titled Truth in
Lending Act, and its latest incarnation, the 2009 CARD Act, require increased
disclosure of certain information to consumers, such as the length of time it will
take to pay off a balance by making only minimum payments; the costs associated
with exceeding a credit limit (accompanied by an opt-in procedure allowing the
consumer to choose not to incur these costs); and the creation of an online database
of the terms and conditions attached to more than 300 different cards.124 Similarly,
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB") states that its primary goal is
to provide transparency to consumers.125
There are flaws in both the initial premise and the favored remedy of
neoclassical economists' analysis of market failure. Herbert A. Simon describes
the true behavior of the consumer as one informed by bounded rationality. 126
Bounded rationality contrasts with perfect rationality, which "requires a complete
knowledge and anticipation of the consequences that will follow on each
119. Id at 46.
120. See Richard A. Epstein & Oren Bar-Gill, Consumer Contracts: Behavioral
Economics vs. Neoclassical Economics 4-5 (NELLCO Legal Scholarship Repository,
Working Paper No. 91, 2007), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1095&context-nyu lewp.
121. See, e.g., DAVID S. EvANs & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH PLASTIC:
THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION IN BUYING AND BORROWING 107-10 (2d ed. 2005); MANNING,
supra note 41; MANN, supra note 40, at 159-65; Littwin, supra note 22, at 497-98;
Elizabeth Warren, The Over-Consumption Myth and Other Tales of Economics, Law and
Morality, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1485 (2004).
122. Epstein & Bar-Gill, supra note 120, at 1.
123. David Dante Troutt, Ghettoes Revisited: Antimarkets, Consumption, and
Empowerment, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 29-30 (2000).
124. 15 U.S.C. § 1637 (2012); CARD Act, supra note 35.
125. See CFPB Report, supra note 78, at 9-10.
126. See HERBERT A. SIMON ET AL., ECONOMICS, BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND THE
COGNITIVE REVOLUTION 3-6 (1992).
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choice." 27 In reality, neither consumers' "knowledge nor their powers of
calculation allow them to achieve the high level of optimal adaptation of means to
ends that is posited in economics." 28 Instead, consumers participate in the market
based on limited information and often with considerable constraints on their
choices and actions.' 29
Bounded rationality entails shortcut reasoning that consumers use because
they are unable to observe their environment in all of its complexity. 130
Alternatives may be unknown or accompanied by uncertain payoffs. When making
credit decisions, it is logical to discount toward the present when it is unclear
whether a future income stream will exist. Consumers also prioritize immediate
expenses over potential future gains.
Bounded rationality renders the ideal of a perfectly functioning market
virtually unattainable. A narrow focus on disclosure similarly fails to reflect the
realities of credit card use for most consumers. 132 For subsistence users, credit
cards are often the only viable means of paying bills and acquiring necessities,
including medical attention and car repairs, or alleviating stress through comfort or
status purchases. When consumers face severely limited options, disclosures about
future consequences or minute and obscure differences in products are irrelevant.
Not only is disclosure ineffective at the point of purchase, it also has a limited
capacity to assist the consumer who has already entered a debt spiral. As highly
indebted cardholders, these consumers are ineligible for new cards with more
reasonable rates or transfer conditions.
1. The CARD Act
In 2009, the CARD Act amended the Truth in Lending Act by adding a
number of provisions intended to reduce consumer confusion, eliminate some of
the credit card companies' most egregious practices, and identify areas of potential
concern for future changes to the law. 1 According to the July 2011 CFPB
progress report, after the CARD Act's implementation, "the total amount
consumers are paying for their credit cards is no higher, on average, than it was
one, two, or three years ago."l34 In other words, the CARD Act provided no
127. HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 93 (4th ed. 1997).
128. SIMON ET AL., supra note 126, at 3.
129. Id.; see also KAARYN S. GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE: PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY 5 (2011) (discussing bounded
rationality in the context of welfare recipients).
130. HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN: SOCIAL AND RATIONAL 261 (1957); see
also Daniel Kahneman, Maps ofBounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral
Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449 (2003).
131. Sunstein, supra note 25, at 252.
132. Id. at 270.
133. CARD Act, supra note 35.
134. CFPB Report, supra note 78, at 12. Although some banks reported losses,
overall profits did not drop. See Cyrus Sanati, JP Morgan Feels Bigger Pinch From Rules
on Fees, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2010, 3:50 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/
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financial benefit to consumers. This is due in part to the industry's creative
response to the CARD Act of developing new ways to generate profits through
high processing fees on new cards and other new fees. 35 The CARD Act does,
however, have some positive effects on industry practices.
The CARD Act prohibits universal default, a practice that previously
allowed any change in a person's credit score to lead to increased interest rates on
all of that person's credit cards. The increases occurred even when the change
resulted from an unrelated action, such as one late payment on one card or the
addition of new mortgage or car payments. Most consumers were unaware of
this practice or learned about it subsequent to the precipitous act. The ban on
universal default increases consumer protection for all credit card users.
To reduce fees resulting from consumers unwittingly exceeding their
credit limits, the CARD Act establishes an opt-in procedure that requires consent
to the extension of credit beyond pre-set limits with an accompanying charge for
the privilege.' 3 7 This provision does little to help the subsistence user, who must
choose to exceed her limit when necessary. It does, however, increase lifestyle
users' awareness of the consequences of their purchases and allow those users to
make more informed choices regarding the value of their purchases based on their
true costs.
The CARD Act also imposes new disclosure requirements. Credit card
bills now state, in reasonably sized print, how long it will take to pay off the
principal if the consumer chooses to make the minimum payment. 138 This change
may influence lifestyle users to make fewer purchases and put more money toward
increased payments. It is unlikely to alter the credit decisions of subsistence users.
The CARD Act identifies several groups that might require unique
protections.139 In compliance with this part of the Act, the Government
Accountability Office ("GAO") produced a report describing the impact of lack of
English proficiency on credit card use.140 It describes significant barriers to
financial literacy for non-English speakers due to the lack of availability of
documents and educational materials in their native languages, the complexity of
jpmorgan-feels-bigger-pinch-from-rules-on-fees/?src=busln (estimating losses at between
$500 and $700 million due to the CARD Act).
135. Sudeep Reddy, Card Issuers' Novel Ways Outflank Law, WALL ST. J., June
3, 2010, at Cl.
136. See Eboni Nelson, From the Schoolhouse to the Poorhouse: The Credit
CARD Act's Failure to Adequately Protect Young Consumers, 56 VILL. L. REV. 1, 4-5
(2011) (citing CARD Act § 101(a)).
137. See id.
138. CARD Act, supra note 35, § 201.
139. See id. §§ 301-05, 123 Stat. at 1748-51 (focusing on protection of underage
consumers and college students); id. § 513 (mandating investigation of "the relationship
between fluency in the English language and financial literacy").
140. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-518, CONSUMER FINANCE:
FACTORS AFFECTING THE FINANCIAL LITERACY OF INDIVIDUALS WITH LIMITED ENGLISH
PROFICIENCY 8-10 (2010) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/
assets/310/304561.pdf.
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translated documents, problems with interpretation provided by minor children,
cultural differences in financial norms, and a negative view of carrying debt in
some countries that prevents consumers from establishing a credit history in the
United States. 141 Responses to these obstacles, if implemented, might positively
affect Spanish-speaking and immigrant consumers.
Another new disclosure provision compels the Federal Reserve to create
an online database listing the terms and conditions of more than 300 credit card
products, to help consumers find a card to meet their personal financial needs. 142
The database in its current form is unlikely to increase or facilitate credit card
shopping, however, because the language of the agreements is overly technical and
complex.143 Consumers can bypass the arduous task of sifting through the
information in the database by going to www.lowcards.com to acquire similar
information that is organized in a more consumer-friendly manner.'" The ability
of this site to help low-income consumers depends on access to the Internet,
awareness of the site's existence, and the availability of choice in card selection.
The CARD Act served to frustrate credit card companies and consumers
alike. While banning some harmful practices, it left the door open to others, such
as increased fees. Initial resistance to the Act from the banks quelled once it
became clear that it did not affect profit levels. Its overall effect was to make a
gesture towards consumer protection without reducing, and perhaps increasing,
consumer debt.
2. Increased Competition Through Antitrust Intervention
Antitrust law can reduce barriers to free competition that lead to market
failure.145 The credit card market is highly concentrated, dominated by only four
major brands. These four brands all offer very similar products to low-income
consumers. This parallel conduct raises the specter of anticompetitive behavior. 146
To establish whether anticompetitive conduct explains the lack of price
differentiation, it is necessary first to identify the relevant market. This market
could consist of the four major credit card brands, all credit card issuers, or some
subset of issuers. Because issuers generally set interest rates, fees, and other
conditions, the credit card issuer market is the most relevant.
141. See id.
142. Credit Card Agreement Database, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/credit-cards/agreements/ (last updated Dec. 28, 2012).
143. See Sewell Chan & Andrew Martin, Credit Card Database Is Heroic, and
Mystifying, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2010, at B8.
144. LowCARDs.cOM, http://www.lowcards.com/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2011).
145. See id. at 2.
146. For some interesting earlier arguments about the competitiveness of the
market, see Lawrence M. Ausubel, The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market,
81 AM. ECON. REv. 50 (1991). But see Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Credit Cards, 3
CHAP. L. REv. 79 (2000) (refuting Ausubel).
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If the market is only a few firms, an oligopoly, common practices or
pricing amongst these firms may indicate tacit collusion.147 Price fixing through
tacit collusion is illegal under § I of the Sherman Act, as well as under § 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act.148 Some factors that make a market conducive to
collusion are present in the credit card industry, including high concentration on
the sellers' side, a large number of poorly informed buyers, economies of scale,
barriers to entry, and a fungible or homogeneous product.149
There are several barriers to establishing tacit collusion amongst credit
card issuers, however. First, there are hundreds of issuers, not just the few firms
that would make up an oligopoly. This makes tacit collusion between them
unlikely due to logistical obstacles, such as lack of information about each others'
pricing in an industry that is notoriously secretive. 50 Second, each issuer offers
dozens of different cards with varying interest rates and conditions, making it
difficult to establish tacit collusion based on products available to only one, or a
few, segments of the population, such as low-income consumers. Third, it is
possible that each issuer's decision not to offer competitive rates to certain
consumers arises simply from a calculation that doing so would not increase its
profits. This type of parallel behavior is usually insufficient to establish agreement
in an oligopoly.1st
Ronald J. Mann attributes the rapid concentration of the credit card
lending market not to collusion but to the top issuers' investment in the
sophisticated underwriting technology that makes market segmentation possible. 5 2
Mann's explanation is reasonable, particularly in light of the high profit margin
that low-income consumers provide to the lenders positioned to exploit them. The
elimination of the majority of issuers, who do not possess the underwriting
technology, from serious competition in the market frees the top issuers to earn
substantial profits based on these models without having to compete with each
other on price, because the models can identify enou low-income consumers to
generate substantial profits for all of the companies. The top issuers effectively
act as a cartel and charge monopoly prices unfettered by antitrust law, which does
not allow for intervention under these circumstances.
Courts have long grappled with the antitrust implications of activity by
the four major brands, including the joint venture by MasterCard and Visa that
imposed exclusionary rules on banks that prevented them from offering Discover
147. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 159, 162 (3d ed. 2005).
148. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 45 (2012).
149. HOvENKAMP, supra note 147, at 170.
150. Information about how credit card issuers price their products is not publicly
available.
151. See Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris U.S.A., 346 F.3d 1287, 1292-93,
1298-1300 (11th Cir. 2003).
152. Mann, supra note 61, at 6, 8.
153. Id.
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or American Express cards alongside their brands,15 4 and the setting of merchant
fees." 5 Lack of competition at the brand level, however, does not directly impact
the availability of reasonable rates and conditions for low-income consumers.
One potential solution to the lack of competition in the market would be
the introduction of a public bank that issues credit cards. The 2008 financial crisis
led to a call by some economists for the creation of state and federal public banks
that would expand revolving lending without raising taxes, thereby generating
essential employment and entrepreneurial opportunities.156 To date, there is only
one public bank in the United States, the Bank of North Dakota ("BND"). '
Nineteen other states have introduced legislation for publicly owned banks or for
studies or task forces to determine how a publicly-owned bank would operate in
their jurisdiction.'5 8 BND, which is capitalized by the state and operates for the
benefit of North Dakota's citizens, weathered the financial crisis successfully. 59
North Dakota was the only state to emerge from the crisis with a budget surplus.' 60
BND primarily provides services to other banks and small businesses, as opposed
154. See, e.g., United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 234 (2d Cir.
2003).
155. LLOYD CONSTANTINE, PRICELESS: THE CASE THAT BROUGHT DOWN THE
VISA/MASTERCARD BANK CARTEL 15-16 (2009).
156. See, e.g., ELLEN HODGSON BROWN, WEB OF DEBT: THE SHOCKING TRUTH
ABOUT OUR MONEY SYSTEM AND How WE CAN BREAK FREE 421-30 (3d ed. 2008);
TIMOTHY A. CANOVA & BETTY HUTTON WILLIAMS, THE PUBLIC OPTION: THE CASE FOR
PARALLEL PUBLIC BANKING INSTITUTIONS 1-2 (2011), available at http://growth.new
america.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Canova%20Public%200ption%201%20J
uly.pdf; Michael Brei & Alfredo Schclarek, PUBLIC BANK LENDING IN CRISIS TIMES (2010),
available at http://depot.gdnet.org/cms/conference/papers/Scharleks%20paper 6.3.pdf;
Jason Judd & Heather McGhee, Banking on America: How Main Street Partnership Banks
Can Improve Local Economies, DEMOS (April 21, 2011), available at
http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/DemosNationalBankPaper.pdf, The
Giant Banks are ALREADY State-Sponsored... So Why Not Create Public Banks to at
Least Share the Gains, Help Out Main Street, and Grow our Local Economies?,
WASHINGTON'S BLOG (June 13, 2011), http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2011/06/the-giant-
banks-are-already-state-sponsored-so-why-not-create-public-banks-to-at-least-share-the-
gains-help-out-main-street-and-grow-our-local-economies.htil (relying on work by
economist Steve Keen, financial writer Yves Smith et al.).
157. See BANK N. D., http://www.banknd.nd.gov (last visited July 31, 2011).
158. State Activity, Resource and Contact Info, PUB. BANKING INST.,
http://publicbankinginstitute.org/state-info.htm (last visited Ja. 31, 2013). The 19 states are
Arizona, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Idaho, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Oregon,
Vermont, Virginia and Washington. In Massachusetts, the commission to investigate the
logistics of a public bank is already in force. Id.
159. See Ellen Brown, Washington State Joins the Movement for Public Banking,
YES! (Jan. 24, 2011), http://www.yesmagazine.org/new-economy/washington-state-joins-
movement-for-public-banking (stating that North Dakota reported its largest budget surplus
in history in 2009); Judd & McGhee, supra note 156, at 2-4.
160. See Brown, supra note 159.
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to individuals.' 6 1 Although BND does not issue credit cards, it does make low-
interest loans.162 If BND or another public bank were to issue credit cards on
similarly reasonable terms, consumers at the lowest end of the wealth and income
scales would take their business to the public bank, leaving private institutions
dependent on annual and merchant fees for their profits. 6 3
Another possible role for public banking, espoused by economists such as
Richard C. Cook and Peter Gowan, is the regulation of credit as a public utility
through community-run investment banks.'" Cook envisions a banking system
under public control that would provide low-interest loans to individuals and
businesses, similar to the Depression-era Reconstruction Finance and Home
Owners Loan corporations.'6 5 Public control of credit could correct for the
underrepresentation of low-income consumers' interests by ensuring that interest
rates reflect calculated risk, not businesses' capacity to exploit lack of social and
financial capital.
B. Behavioral Economists
Behavioral economists and psychologists challenge and build upon the
neoclassical approach by identifying cognitive mechanisms that impede consumer
rationality.' 66 Behavioral solutions to market failure seek to debias or influence the
cognitive strategies of a decision-maker.167 Like the neoclassical approach, this
conceptualization rarely takes into account the harsh realities faced by vulnerable
consumers who, even if subject to successful debiasing strategies, must misuse
credit.
The four major cognitive mechanisms affecting credit card use identified
by behavioral economists are hyperbolic discounting, imperfect self-control, over-
optimism, and miswanting.168
161. Judd & McGhee, supra note 156, at 2-4. Judd and McGhee refer to these
types of state banks as "partnership banks." Id. at 6.
162. Id. at 2.
163. The limit on merchant fees imposed by the Federal Reserve in November
2011 makes this a particularly unappealing prospect for credit card companies.
164. RICHARD C. COOK, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: THE HOPE OF MONETARY
REFORM (2009); Peter Gowan, Crisis in the Heartland: Consequences of the New Wall
Street System, 55 NEw LEFT REV. 5, 22-24 (2009), available at http://www.newleft
review.org/A2759.
165. COOK, supra note 164.
166. See, e.g., Bar-Gill, supra note 9, at 1395-1401; Richard L. Wiener et al.,
Consumer Credit Card Use: The Roles of Creditor Disclosure and Anticipated Emotion, 13
J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 32 (2007).
167. See Wiener et al., supra note 166, at 33.
168. Some literature refers to hyperbolic discounting as "time inconsistency." See,
e.g., ABHUIT V. BANERJEE & ESTHER DUFLO, POOR ECONOMICS: A RADICAL RETHINKING OF
THE WAY TO FIGHT GLOBAL POVERTY 64-65, 194-95 (2011). Similarly, over-optimism is
sometimes called underestimation. Despite the proliferation of nomenclature to represent
similar ideas, these four theories represent the bulk of the work in this area.
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A hyperbolic discounter prefers short-term payoffs to future gains.'6 For
example, a hyperbolic discounter will choose to receive $100 today instead of
$110 in 30 days, because she discounts the value of future rewards. This
discounting will also prompt her to prefer to receive $110 in 31 days over $100 in
30 days, because both of those dates are sufficiently far in the future that she
considers them to be equivalent. On day 30, however, she will revert to preferring
to receive $100 on that day over receiving $110 the next.
Applying this theory to credit card use, a hyperbolic discounter will
acquire a card in the present, because she believes that both future borrowing and
repayment will be manageable. Similarly, on the date of purchase, she will
discount the pain of paying off the debt. The immediate emotional gratification of
acquiring goods consistently dominates the hyperbolic discounter's mind.o70
Compounding this shortsightedness is the use of a plastic card, which eliminates
the pain of spending often associated with cash payments.' 7' Hyperbolic
discounting accounts for the unique pricing patterns of credit cards: low up-front
short-term prices, such as annual fees; and high long-term elements, such as
interest rates and penalty fees.172
Imperfect self-control can lead a consumer to make a series of minor
borrowing decisions that lead to the accumulation of unmanageable debt. In other
words, "[d]ebtors who never dream of seeking a $5,000 bank loan might run up
$5,000 in charges of $50 at a time."1 73 While succumbing to small temptations
may seem relatively harmless at the point of purchase, piecemeal borrowing can
eventually plunge the user into debt that she can only escape through
bankruptcy. 174 Low-income users are particularly susceptible to this slippery slope
of debt accumulation because they often need small-value items, such as cleaning
supplies or diapers, not normally associated with the type of extravagant
169. Both Littwin and Bar-Gill offer good descriptions of this phenomenon. See
Littwin, supra note 22, at 467-69; Bar-Gill, supra note 9, at 1396-97. This mental process
can also be viewed as part of short-termism, a cultural phenomenon that values instant
gratification over long-term rewards.
170. Interestingly, research reveals that this is a physical, not just an emotional
phenomenon. In a study conducted by a team of economists, psychologists, and
neuroscientists, they observed brain activity through fMRI scanners while participants chose
between present versus future rewards, future versus more distant future, and more distant
and even more distant future rewards. Parts of the brain associated with the limbic system,
(responding to visceral, immediate rewards) were activated only in the first instance,
whereas the lateral cortex responded equally intensely to all three choices. BANERJEE &
DUFLO, supra note 168, at 195 (citing Samuel M. McClure, Separate Neural Systems Value
Immediate and Delayed Monetary Rewards, 306 Sci. 503 (2004)), available at
http://www.uwlax.edulfaculty/giddings/ECO474/Week6/SeparateNeuralSystems.pdf).
171. For studies on the effects of negative emotions on purchasing decisions, see
Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, supra note 25; Wiener et al., supra note 166.
172. See Bar-Gill, supra note 9, at 1376, 1396-97.
173. TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY
AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 178 (1989).
174. See TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN
DEBT 111 (2000) (labeling consumers who fall into this trap "sliders").
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purchasing that leads to financial distress.'7 5 The relative ease of making purchases
with a credit card also exacerbates the temptations of incremental borrowing.
Credit card companies are willing to extend small amounts of credit to low-income
consumers because the resulting debt, even at low lending levels, is profitable.176
Another popular theory of credit card use is the over-optimism bias. 177
Consumers consistently underestimate the likelihood of adverse events that would
create a need to borrow, such as accidents, illnesses suffered by themselves or
loved ones, or job loss.' 7 8 These unfortunate circumstances ironically become
more likely as debt amasses, because financial stress can lead to sickness, sleep
deprivation, and increased responsibilities, such as childcare.179 Over-optimism
bias, like hyperbolic discounting, obscures the potential harm of unfair contract
terms that arise only upon default or late payments.
Miswanting is the desire to purchase items that do not promote a person's
welfare, or the opposite, a lack of desire for things that would increase an
individual's well-being. 80 A desire to improve one's social position relative to
friends and associates often drives miswanting, leading a person to use credit to
fund a purchase that ultimately does not in fact provide any long-lasting psychic or
material benefits.' 81 Miswanting extends beyond the point of purchase. Many
consumers view the gratifying aspects of a once-desired acquisition negatively
after the fact, leading to a shift in desire to another object.182 Credit card
companies exploit a tendency to miswant through marketing and advertising that
equate spending with "priceless" social and psychological gains.
175. See Littwin, supra note 22, at 469.
176. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 173, at 23-24; Littwin, supra note 22, at
452-53 (noting "low-income families often pay such extraordinary rates of interest that they
are among the industry's most profitable customers").
177. Bar-Gill, supra note 9, at 1400; see also Sean Hannon Williams, Sticky
Expectations: Responses to Persistent Over-Optimism in Marriage, Employment Contracts,
and Credit Card Use, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 733, 742-46 (2009).
178. Bar-Gill, supra note 9, at 1400.
179. Id.
180. See Sunstein, supra note 25, at 253. Sunstein attributes excessive borrowing
to five problems: cumulative cost neglect (described as incremental borrowing and
imperfect self-control above); procrastination and inertia, leading to late fees (this factor
might also explain consumers' tendency not to transfer their balances after the expiration of
low introductory or "teaser" rates); unrealistic optimism; myopia and self-control problems
(similar to hyperbolic discounting in that it describes an emphasis on the short term at the
expense of the future); and miswanting or relative position. See id. at 251-53.
181. See Howard Beales & Lacey L. Plache, Rationality, Revolving, and
Rewards: An Analysis of Revolving Behavior on New Credit Cards 2 (April 20, 2007)
(unpublished conference paper), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/consumerbehavior/docs/
papers/Beales PlachePaper.pdf.
182. Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, Miswanting: Some Problems in the
Forecasting of Future Affective States, in FEELING AND THINKING: THE ROLE OF AFFECT IN
SOCIAL COGNITION 178 (Joseph P. Forgas ed., 2000).
183. See Wiener et al., supra note 166, at 33.
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW
The primary strategy to disrupt these cognitive processes is debiasing, "a
procedure for reducing or eliminating biases from the cognitive strategies of a
decision-maker."' 84 Debiasing can occur through law, education, or changes to the
credit card payment system.'8 5 For example, Netflix engaged in a successful
educational debiasing campaign by convincing DVD-watchers that Blockbuster
was profiting primarily from late fees and that consumers could save money by
paying a higher upfront rental fee and no late fees.' 8 6 For credit card consumers,
psychologists have proposed the use of decomposition strategy, whereby credit
card bills debundle purchases from a total to a series of subcategories to improve
consumer recall, prompting the consumer to estimate more closely the correct
amount of her future expenses. 8 1
Debiasing strategies are unlikely to be effective in reducing debt and
spending among subsistence users, who primarily amass debt due to financial
exigency. Although a subsistence user might exacerbate her debt due to the
cognitive disabilities described above, "households with low incomes tend to use
credit to help cope with budgeting troubles instead of increasing purchasing
power."' Any serious attempt to improve the subsistence user's circumstances
therefore should not focus on her complicity in her financial distress. The few
studies that have examined the role that poverty-induced anxiety has on decision-
making support the idea that concrete aid, not cognitive strategies, would have the
greatest positive effect on low-income consumers' credit card use.' 8 9 Economic
conditions, such as falling real wages, rising prices, and unemployment, play a
184. David Arnott, Cognitive Biases and Decision Support Systems Development:
A Design Science Approach, 16 INFo. Sys. J., 55, 62 (2006).
185. See generally Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law,
35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199 (2006).
186. MANN, supra note 40, at 136-37.
187. See Joydeep Srivastava & Priya Raghubir, Debiasing Using Decomposition:
The Case of Memory-Based Credit Card Expense Estimates, 12 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL.
253, 254 (2002).
188. Watkins, supra note 24, at 419-20 (citing Lillian Y. Zhu & C.B. Meeks,
Effects of Low-Income Families' Ability and Willingness to Use Consumer Credit on
Subsequent Outstanding Credit Balances, 28 J. CONSUMER AFF. 403, 404 (1994); Christian
E. Weller, Need or Want: What Explains the Run-Up in Consumer Debt?, 41 J. EcoN.
ISSUEs 583, 584 (2007)).
189. Researchers documented a decrease in cortisol levels by individuals who
received financial assistance. BANERJEE & DUFLO, supra note 168, at 140-41 (citing Brian
P. Ramos & Amy F.T. Arnsten, Adrenergic Pharmacology and Cognition: Focus on the
Prefrontal Cortex, 113 PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 523 (2007); Todd A. Hare et al.,
Self-Control in Decision-Making Involves Modulation of the vmPFC Valuation System, 324
SCIENCE 646 (2009); Daria Knoch et al., Diminishing Reciprocal Fairness by Disrupting the
Prefrontal Cortex, 314 SCIENCE 829 (2006); Anthony J. Porcelli & Mauricio R. Delgado,
Acute Stress Modulates Risk Taking in Financial Decision Making, 20 PSYCHOL. ScI. 278
(2009)).
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large part in precipitating subsistence borrowing.190 Regulation of the credit card
industry could, however, reduce the harmful impact of economic recession.
III. STRUCTURAL INEQUALITY ANALYSIS AND PROPOSALS
Structural inequality arises from entrenched patterns that govern each
individual's place in society, beginning from birth. Elaborate social rules and
dynamics determine where a person lives, works, and plays; with whom she
associates; and the social and financial status she achieves. Upward class mobility
is rare, particularly for the bottom economic quintile of the population. '9 1 Race
plays a vital role in determining class position and social status.
A. Structural Inequality Analysis
Class and race have been inextricably linked since the founding of the
United States. White Americans' early domination of high-level institutions, due to
slavery and Jim Crow, allowed them to set rules to perpetuate their dominance of
essential social resources. This dominance continued even after overt
discrimination became subsumed by colorblind ideology.192 White privilege
became entrenched in all aspects of American society through the acquisition of
prime residential space, elite education, and profitable employment, accomplished
primarily through social networking.' 9 3  Daria Roithmayr describes the
development of economically motivated white "racial cartels" that created a lasting
monopoly of society's most valuable assets through positive feedback loops.194 An
example of a positive feedback loop is the informal network through which most
people obtain employment.195 People recommend their friends and acquaintances,
usually members of the same racial and socioeconomic group, for positions,
190. See Lois R. Lupica, The Consumer Debt Crisis and the Reinforcement of
Class Position, 40 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 557, 588-89 (2009) ("When debt is used in an attempt
to escape extreme financial exigency ... consumers are not primarily concerned with
emotional comfort, the satisfaction of material desires, or the creation of an identity . . . .").
191. See ToM HERTZ, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, UNDERSTANDING MOBILITY IN
AMERICA 8 (2006), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/hertz-mobility
analysis.pdf; Gregory Mantsios, Class in America-2003, in RACE, CLASS AND GENDER IN
THE UNITED STATES: AN INTEGRATED STUDY 193, 203 (Paula S. Rothenberg ed., 7th ed.
2006); JULIA B. ISAACS, BROOKINGS INST., INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF ECONOMIC
MOBILITY 2-4 (2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Research/Files/
Reports/2008/2/economic%20mobility/o2OsawhillI/02economic.mobilitysawhillch3.pdf;
Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Lessons and Caveats, 74 TEx. L.
REV. 1847, 1862 (1996).
192. See, e.g., EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-
BLIND RACISM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES (2009);
Ian Haney-Lopez, A Nation of Minorities: Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness,
59 STAN. L. REV. 985 (2007).
193. DARIA ROITHMAYR, THEM THAT'S GOT SHALL GET: WHY RACIAL
INEQUALITY PERSISTS (forthcoming).
194. Id.
195. Daria Roithmayr, Racial Cartels, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 45, 47-48 (2010).
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thereby perpetually replicating insider group domination of an occupation. 9 6
Although this phenomenon occurs at all class levels, it has a harmful effect on
lower-income individuals.
Immigration laws that gave preference to whites also laid the foundation
for whites to represent the highest income and wealth levels.197 Statistics released
in 2011 revealed that African Americans have one-twentieth the amount of wealth
that whites have,' 9 8 even where levels of income and education are the same.199
Similarly, Latino households have a median wealth of one-eighteenth that of white
households. 200 The median net worth of Latino households in 2009 was $6,325, as
compared to $113,149 for white households. 20 1 African-American and Latino
households have considerably more credit card debt than white households.202
Eighty-nine percent of African-American households and 79% of Latino
households, as compared to only 54% of white households, carry credit card
debt.203 More than twice as many African Americans as whites pay interest rates
higher than 20% on their balances-15% versus 7%-and 13% of Latino
cardholders pay more than 20% interest. 204 African Americans and Latinos also
pay more late fees than whites. 205 The households with the lowest incomes pay the
highest interest rates, and almost twice as many single women pay higher interest
rates than single men. 206 These statistics do not appear to correlate with default risk
or socioeconomic status.
Instead, these statistics reflect industry practices that exploit and
exacerbate existing inequalities. Credit card companies confine low-income
individuals to a subprime market and attempt to steer many middle-class African
196. Id at 77.
197. IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW (2006).
198. RAKESH KOCHHAR ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., WEALTH GAPS RISE TO
RECORD HIGHS BETWEEN WHITES, BLACKS AND HISPANICS (2011), available at
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/07/SDT-Wealth-Report 7-26-11_FINAL.pdf.
The study revealed that the median wealth of black households fell by 53% between 2005
and 2009 due to the housing bubble and recession. In 2009, the "typical" African-American
household had $5677 in wealth, and 35% of African-American households had zero or
negative net wealth. Id.
199. MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH:
A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 214 (tenth anniversary ed. 2006). See generally
DALTON CONLEY, BEING BLACK, LIVING IN THE RED: RACE, WEALTH, AND SOCIAL POLICY IN
AMERICA (2d ed. 2009).
200. KOCHHAR ET AL., supra note 198, at 1.
201. Id.
202. NAACP, Usury: The Impact of Credit Card Debt and High Interest Rates on
African American Wealth 1 (2009), available at http://naacp.3cdn.net/0d056e220a879625
b7_zgm6bxcpj.pdf.
203. Id.
204. Wheary & Draut, supra note 70, at 2, 6.
205. See id. at 8.
206. Id. at 6-7. An analysis of the disparities in debt by gender is beyond the
scope of this paper, but is an important topic for future work in this area.
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Americans and Latinos into subprime loans.207 Subprime lending refers to loans
characterized by higher than normal interest rates and less favorable terms,
ostensibly due to a greater risk of default.208 Once a consumer enters the subprime
market, often as a result of manipulative and deceptive targeted marketing, exit
becomes nearly impossible, as interest rates and fees quickly amass so that
payments perpetually fail to erode the principal loan. 209 Low-income households
often cannot leave the subprime market because they are particularly susceptible to
shocks, such as loss of employment, illnesses, and rising prices of consumer
goods. 210
African Americans and Latinos bear the brunt of the credit card
companies' predatory practices both because they are overrepresented in the
lower-income levels, 211 due to historical and present structural inequalities, and
because of racial discrimination. 212
1. Structural Exploitation ofAfrican Americans and Latinos
Deeply entrenched structural inequality, originating in slavery and
reinforced by policy, cultural stereotypes, and segregation, creates the
circumstances that allow credit card companies to exploit vulnerabilities in African
American households for profit. The 20-to-1 wealth gap between African
Americans and whites increases African Americans' dependence on credit cards
and deprives them of the safety net that often protects white households in times of
crisis. 3 African Americans also have lower incomeS214 and employment rates
than whites.215 In 1995, Melvin Oliver and Thomas Shapiro estimated that most
middle class African Americans could survive on their savings for only one month
207. See Brescia, supra note 1, at 166-67; see also Creola Johnson, The Magic of
Group Identity: How Predatory Lenders Use Minorities to Target Communities of Color, 17
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 165, 167 (2010).
208. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 18, at 38.
209. Id. at 57-58.
210. See id. at 64.
211. NAACP, supra note 202, at 3.
212. "African Americans and Latinos are disproportionately victimized, not
through happenstance, but because predatory lenders intentionally target them." Johnson,
supra note 207, at 167. "Even when credit scores and other variables were similar to whites,
minorities were still much more likely to receive subprime loans." Id. at 179.
213. A 2011 study revealed that the median wealth of white households is 20
times that of black households and 18 times that of Hispanic households. KOCHHAR ET AL.,
supra note 198, at 1. "[T]he typical African-American household had just $5,677 in wealth
(assets minus debts) in 2009; the typical Hispanic household had $6,325 in wealth; and the
typical white household had $113,149. Moreover, about a third of black (35%) and Hispanic
(31%) households had zero or negative net worth in 2009, compared with 15% of white
households." Id. at 1-2.
214. "On average, African Americans and Latinos earn 62 and 69 cents,
respectively, for every dollar earned by their white counterparts." NAACP, supra note 202,
at 3.
215. In April 2009, the overall unemployment rate for African Americans was
15%, whereas the national average was 8.9%. Id.
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after a loss of income.216 In the wake of the unprecedented loss of property and
jobs precipitated by the 2008 financial crisis, some race pundits now predict the
complete demise of the African American middle class. 217
The wealth gap originated in government policies enacted following
World War II, such as the Social Security and Federal Housing Acts.218 The Social
Security Act did not cover agricultural and service workers, which excluded most
African Americans from benefit eligibility. 219 The Federal Housing Act channeled
home loans away from urban neighborhoods where African Americans lived and
into white suburbs.220 The government also openly used and encouraged use of
racially restrictive covenants to maintain property values in white
neighborhoods.22 1
Historical restrictions on the types of businesses in which African
Americans could participate steered them into specific industries, the majority of
which did not offer the potential for substantial profits.222 Moreover, African-
American businesses were traditionally confined to African-American
neighborhoods and catered to a mostly African-American clientele, many of whom
did not have high levels of disposable income.223 Although some of these niche
industries flourished, such as hair and beauty products (which depend for the most
part on the negative societal images of their clientele),224 many African-American
businesses struggled to survive, particularly as successful African Americans
216. OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 199, at 99. The authors report that "[at]
poverty living standards, 35 percent of the black middle class might last for one month, and
27 percent might hold out for three." Id.
217. See, e.g., Devona Walker, How Ruthless Banks Gutted the Black Middle
Class and Got Away With It, ALTERNET (Sept. 3, 2010), http://www.alternet.org/economy/
148068/howruthless banksguttedthe black middleclass and got awaywith it/
(reporting that black and Latino families owned more than half of California's foreclosed
homes).
218. See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 199, at 40-42.
219. Id. Due to minimum amount requirements, even blacks in eligible
occupations often did not qualify for benefits. For example, in 1935, 42% of blacks in
eligible occupations failed to meet the minimum income requirements, while only 22% of
whites did. Id at 40. Southern legislators deliberately structured benefits policies to leave
out domestic and agricultural workers, but the Social Security Act itself was colorblind. See
id. at 4(-41.
220. Id at 41-43. To facilitate racial segregation, the Federal Housing Act
handbook provided a model restrictive covenant to white homebuyers. Id. at 41-42.
221. Brian Gilmore, Chances Are: Lessons from the 1962 United States Civil
Rights Commission Housing Discrimination Hearings in Washington D.C. for the Current
Foreclosure Crisis, 3 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1 (2013).
222. Martha L. Olney, When Your Word is Not Enough: Race, Collateral, and
Household Credit, 58 J. ECON. HIST. 408, 425-31 (1998) (citing a study reporting that, in
1920, over half of all black businessmen were in the grocery industry).
223. See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 199, at 48-51 (describing the "economic
detour" that compelled a black businessman to "seek his customers or clients 'from within
his own race,' no matter the business" (citation omitted)).
224. GOOD HAIR (Chris Rock Productions & HBO Films 2009).
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emigrated away from all-African-American neighborhoods. Ghettoized economies
prevent financial growth for small African-American businesses and individual
consumers, forcing them to rely on debt to meet monthly expenses.
Many low-income African Americans have a higher cost of living than
whites at the same income levels. African Americans living in poor neighborhoods
pay more for goods and services than people in other neighborhoods pay for
identical products, including basic food items.225 Many inner-city residents lack
the means of transportation to shop for cheaper goods in other places or cannot
travel due to child care, time, or health issues.216 Transportation costs may be
prohibitive, and mass transit often underserves or does not service poor
neighborhoods.227
Credit discrimination against African Americans has a long history.
Martha Olney's study of store credit in the 1910s reveals that, even though most
whites relied on merchant credit to make purchases, stores offered African
Americans only installment credit.228 Under the informal store credit system
offered to whites, merchants did not require the customer to pay either a down
payment or interest.229 Consumers could pay off goods over time without threat of
repossession and build a good credit history in the process.230 Installment credit, in
contrast, involved hefty down payments, gave the merchant the legal right to
repossess the good upon default, and did not allow consumers to build a positive
credit history. 231 Additionally, merchants officially retained title of goods
purchased through installment credit until the consumer rendered full payment.232
As a result of poor treatment by or exclusion from the formal credit
market, African Americans often turn to alternative sources of credit, such as pawn
shops, cash checking services, and payday loans.233 Scholars have written
extensively on these sources of credit, which typically charge exorbitant fees in
225. See Andrea Freeman, Fast Food: Oppression Through Poor Nutrition, 95
CALIF. L. REv. 2221, 2240 (2007); Nareissa Smith, Eatin' Good? Not in this Neighborhood:
A Legal Analysis of Disparities in Food Availability and Quality at Chain Supermarkets in
Poverty-Stricken Areas, 14 MICH. J. RACE & L. 197, 224-25 (2009).
226. People working at more than one job to support a family are extremely
unlikely to have time to travel to other neighborhoods to save money on a purchase,
particularly one that is relatively urgent.
227. The BART system linking San Francisco to the greater metropolitan area is
an example of an expensive system that has expanded to service wealthy neighborhoods
while bypassing areas where many residents do not own cars. See, e.g., Randal O'Toole,
BART Connection to San Jose Will Solve Nothing, SAN JOSE Bus. J., Oct. 5, 2007, available
at http://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/stories/2007/10/08/editorial4.html?page=all
("Thanks to BART, wealthy white commuters have gotten heavily subsidized train rides
while low-income inner-city residents have lost less-costly bus service.").
228. Olney, supra note 222, at 410-12 & tbl. 1.
229. Id. at 409, 415.
230. Id. at 426.
231. Id. at 429.
232. Id. at 427.
233. See Mann, supra note 61, at 262.
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exchange for convenience and access to cash when no other options are
available. 234 In comparison, even the most exploitative credit card interest rates can
appear reasonable.
Cultural stereotypes figure prominently in the relationship between
African Americans and credit card companies. In a study of African-American
financial habits, Sheila Ards and Samuel Myers debunk the myths that African
Americans overspend, fail to save, and are not creditworthy. 235 Contrary to popular
mythology, the study demonstrates that African Americans have high saving rates,
a factor ordinarily correlated with good credit, and that they spend primarily on
rent.236 Generally, the necessity of funneling a significant percentage of income
toward rent prevents individuals from amassing wealth. Homeownership has
therefore historically represented one of the primary reasons for the wealth gap
between African-American and white families.237 The study also reveals no
statistically significant difference in bad credit rates between African-American
and white households at both the lowest and highest wealth levels. 238 Ards and
Myers attribute observed differences in credit rates in the middle wealth range to
differential treatment of African Americans and whites in credit markets.239
The myths associating African Americans with bad credit lead many
African Americans to internalize stereotypes that cause them to assume that they
have bad credit even when they do not. 240 These mistaken beliefs can make
African American consumers agree to bad terms and conditions in credit card
agreements without investigating the possibility of finding a more desirable card.
Credit card companies, equipped with extensive information about applicants'
creditworthiness that often contradicts popular stereotypes, exploit these beliefs by
offering subprime cards to individuals eligible for the regular market.24 1
One of the most damaging stereotypes degrading African Americans'
financial habits is that of the conspicuous consumer. This stereotype originated in
the post Civil War era, when "the central debate in American social life was about
234. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 207, at 176-87; Creola Johnson, Payday
Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2002); Nelson, supra
note 136; Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law, Payday Loans, and Statutory Sleight of
Hand: Salience Distortion in American Credit Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L. REv. 1110,
1123-28 (2008).
235. Sheila D. Ards & Samuel L. Myers, Jr., The Color of Money: Bad Credit,
Wealth, and Race, 45 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 223, 223-39 (2001).
236. Id. at 224, 230-31. Olney offers as explanation for high savings rates in low-
income African American households the necessity of saving to pay off goods purchased on
installment credit. Olney, supra note 222, at 428-29.
237. OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 199, at 111-12 & tbl.5.4. Homeownership
resulting from subprime mortgage loans does not ameliorate this situation, and likely
worsens it.
238. Ards & Myers, supra note 235, at 237 & tbl.8.
239. See id at 236 & tbl.6.
240. Id. at 225.
241. See MANN, supra note 40, at 113-14 (discussing the credit card companies'
reliance on extensive personal data to identify ideal customers and maintain profitability).
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how the newly freed slaves would participate in labor and consumer markets as
well as in the polity." 242 During this period, a white supremacist narrative
describing African-American consumption as "indulgent, impulsive and wasteful"
sought to stem the tide of integration of freed slaves into society.243 Whites deeply
resented African Americans' attempts to best them in displays of status, as well as
their participation in middle class activities, such as attending the theater.24 This
type of resentment continues to the present day, expressed in the common critique
of hip-hop culture as a reflection of African-American consumerism and
materialism, prioritizing the acquisition of "bling" over the consequences of
overspending.
Some African Americans have internalized the conspicuous consumer
stereotype. 246 Bill Cosby popularized the trope with his comment at the NAACP
fiftieth anniversary celebration of Brown v. Board of Education.24 7 Cosby
commented that African-American parents are willing to spend $500 on a pair of
242. David Crockett, Credit, Conspicuous Consumption and Crisis,
COMMONDREAMS.ORG (Apr. 2, 2005), http://www.commondreams.org/views05/0402-
22.htm.
243. See id. (discussing the black consumer myth as understood by historian Ted
Ownby in American Dreams in Mississippi, stated as "the proverbial fool to be soon parted
from his money"); see also Jason Chambers, Equal in Every Way: African Americans,
Consumption and Materialism from Reconstruction to the Civil Rights Movement, 7
ADVERT. & Soc'Y REV. (2006) (surveying African Americans' encounter with material
goods from the end of the Civil War through the end of the Second World War), available
at http://muse.jhu.edu/joumals/asr/v007/7.1chambers.html. Chambers describes
consumption as a tool of anti-oppression:
[B]lacks have long understood the difference between materialism and a
materially-intensive life and have used goods as a way to demonstrate
their desire to be equal in every way with their fellow [white] citizens.
Hence, consumption becomes a means of political and social activism on
par with other better-known efforts such as the battle for voting rights or
an end to racial discrimination.
Id.
244. See, e.g., Hannah Rosen, "Not That Sort of Women": Race, Gender and
Sexual Violence During the Memphis Riot of 1866, in SEX, LOVE, RACE: CROSSING THE
BOUNDARIES IN NORTH AMERICAN HISTORY 267, 269-71 (Martha Hodes ed., 1999)
(describing how white peoples' resentment of African-American women and men entering
leisure spaces and consuming luxury goods contributed to the tensions that sparked the
Memphis Riot of 1866).
245. See, e.g., PAUL BUTLER, LET'S GET FREE: A HIP-Hop THEORY OF JUSTICE
127-28, 191 (2009); Akilah N. Folami, From Habermas to "Get Rich or Die Tryin": Hip
Hop, the Telecommunications Act of 1996, and the Black Public Sphere, 12 MICH. J. RACE
& L. 235, 240 (2007).
246. Glenn Loury identifies a "self-confirming stereotype" as one that arises
because "[o]bservers, by acting on the [statistical] generalization, set in motion a sequence
of events that has the effect of reinforcing their initial judgment." GLENN C. LOURY, THE
ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 23-29 (2002).
247. Bill Cosby, Address at the NAACP on the 50th Anniversary of Brown v.
Board of Education (May 17, 2004), available at http://www.americanrhetoric.com/
speeches/billcosbypoundcakespeech.htm.
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sneakers for their children but will not spend $250 to teach them to read with
Hooked on Phonics. 248 Similarly, E. Franklin Frazier attacked the "black
bourgeoisie" in his bestselling book of that name, and many other African
American authors have identified profligate materialism and consumerism in their
communities as problematic. 24 9 Other stereotypes that interfere with African
Americans' ability to obtain credit on fair terms are: a belief in African American
intellectual inferiority that implies that money is worth more in a white (financially
savvy) person's hands; and the association of African Americans with dishonesty
and crime, leading to a perception that African-American money is tainted.2
Credit card companies use these stereotypes to their advantage by offering
subprime credit cards to middle-class African Americans.
Latinos experience similar targeting for subprime cards, based in part on
the presence of a significant immigrant population in many Latino communities.
The term Latino represents a very broad spectrum of people living in the United
States who have a wide range of interactions with the credit card industry.
Exploitation can arise from language barriers, cultural differences, or the need to
send remittances-conditions that apply much more strongly to immigrant than to
U.S.-born Latinos.251 Latinos' relationships with credit cards may also depend on
national origin. For example, Puerto Ricans share a financial culture with the
United States, but Cubans and Mexicans do not.252
A study by the National Council of La Raza revealed that 22% of Latino
borrowers have no credit score as compared to only 4% of whites and 3% of
African Americans.253 Latinos also often suffer from misconceptions about how to
develop good credit. For example, some Latinos obtain cards with the goal of
building their credit but do not understand the impact that a bad credit score caused
by late payments, exceeding the credit limit, or canceling accounts has on future
credit opportunities.254 Bad credit histories lead to high interest rates, which in turn
248. Id.
249. E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER, BLACK BOURGEOISIE (First Free Press Paperback ed.
1997); see also KAREN HUNTER, STOP BEING NIGGARDLY AND NINE OTHER THINGS BLACK
PEOPLE NEED TO STOP DOING (2010).
250. See Austin, supra note 57, at 1218, 1251.
251. Steven W. Bender, Consumer Protection for Latinos: Overcoming Language
Fraud and English-Only in the Marketplace, 45 Am. U. L. REv. 1027 (1996); see also
Nicole Lutes Fuentes, Comment, Defrauding the American Dream: Predatory Lending in
Latino Communities and Reform of California's Lending Law, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1279, 1305,
1309 (2009); Ezra Rosser, Immigrant Remittances, 41 CONN. L. REv. 1 (2008).
252. American banks serve Puerto Rico but other countries have their own
dominant banks.
253. BEATRIZ IBARRA & ERIC RODRIGUEZ, NAT'L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, LATINO
CREDIT CARD USE: DEBT TRAP OR TICKET TO PROSPERITY? 5-6 (2007), available at
http://www.nclr.org/index.php/publications/latino-credit card use_debt_trap or ticket-to_
prosperity/.
254. JANIS BOWLDER, NAT'L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, SURVIVAL SPENDING: THE
ROLE OF CREDIT CARDS IN HISPANIC HOUSEHOLDS 3-7 (2010), available at
http://www.nclr.org/images/uploads/publications/fileSurvivalSpendingFinal Jan 19 10
-1.pdf.
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make it more difficult to transfer balances to new cards with better rates and terms.
Although there are financial education programs in some Latino communities, they
tend to offer only limited distribution of materials, are often run by credit card-
issuing banks, and in some cases, do the consumer more harm than good.255
Latinos are less likely than whites to shop for a credit card.256 A fear of
rejection also causes some Latinos not to apply or to reapply for cards.257
Countering this trepidation, the credit card companies actively seek out Latino
customers. All of the major credit card issuers invest money in advertising targeted
directly at Latinos. 258 They also manufacture affinity cards designed specifically
255. IBARRA & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 253, at 14; see also Lauren E. Willis,
Against Financial Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REv. 197, 260-64 (2008); Lauren E.
Willis, Evidence and Ideology in Assessing the Effectiveness of Financial Literacy
Education, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 415 (2009).
256. Only seven percent of Latinos who carry a balance reported card shopping as
opposed to twelve percent of whites. IBARRA & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 253, at 7.
257. Id.
258. 2008 data from Nielsen Monitor-Plus revealed that credit card brands and
issuers injected $15.2 million into Spanish television in 2008, $36.5 million in 2007, and
$43.1 million in 2006. Hispanic Advertising: Credit Cards, Hisp. MARKET WK., Apr. 16,
2009, available at http://spanishypinfo.com/media/industry snapshots/Hispanic_.Adver
tising-Credit Cards.pdf. In 2008, credit card companies invested $6.7 million in spot
television dollars, but invested only $1.6 million in 2007. Id. In 2006, they invested $2.6
million in spot radio, and $1.1 million in 2007. Id Visa was the number one advertiser in
the Spanish-speaking market with $19.8 million in 2006, but only $26.3 million in 2007. Id.
The decrease was the result of a strategy shift from national media to local initiatives. Id.
"From 2005 to 2007, Visa increased its total ad expenditure [in the] market from $16.8
million to $26.3 million." Id. MasterCard was the second biggest spender in 2005 and 2006
with $19.2 million. Id. In 2007, it was third after Chase with $6.8 million, and in 2008, it
left the national Hispanic television networks and shifted to spot radio, television and
magazines. Id One of MasterCard's more popular ads featured a luchador (Mexican
wrestler) paying for a makeover with a MasterCard. Id. MasterCard also partnered with
Chase and Telemundo to create a Latino-themed financial education tour that paired a
financial expert with telenovela star Natalia Streignard in sessions designed to educate
Latinos on finance and credit card use. Id. J.P. Morgan Chase emerged as a major investor
in the Spanish-speaking market in 2006 and invested $7.8 million in 2007. Id It
subsequently retreated from the market in 2008 due to the credit crisis and its unplanned
merger/acquisition of Washington Mutual. Id. It did, however, launch a Spanish website
tied to its "Clear & Simple" advertising initiative at www.chaseclaroysimple.com. Id. The
site provides financial tools to help customers manage their accounts to avoid fees, maintain
good interest rates, and protect their access to credit. Id. The bank also ran Spanish ads in
Los Angeles to transition Washington Mutual customers to Chase. Id. GE Money Bank was
the only other company to invest more than $1 million in the Latino market by advertising a
Wal-Mart money card, which is a prepaid Visa card, and investing $1.7 million in network
Spanish television and $53,400 in Spanish cable television in 2007, but it was not active in
2008. Id. Purpose Money MasterCard targeted African Americans and Latinos with less
than perfect credit and invested $782,550 in the Spanish-speaking market in 2007, but
vanished in 2008. Id. Citigroup invested $278,600 in advertisements in Spanish-language
magazines and Bank of America ran spot television ads targeted at Latinos in 2008 and
spent $187,120 in Spanish glossies. Id. HSBC created a website called "El banco local del
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259for Latinos with less desirable terms than the ones offered to white consumers.
Additionally, Latinos have greater vulnerability to credit card fraud, which is often
associated with these affinity cards.2 60
Many Latinos are immigrants who are unfamiliar with the U.S. credit
system and financial products, have cultural differences regarding finances, and/or
face language barriers. The CARD Act mandated the GAO to conduct a study of
the effect of lack of proficiency in English on credit card use. 261 The resulting
report stated that most U.S. financial documents and financial educational
materials are available only in English; that the information and documents related
to financial products are highly complex and confusing, even for native English
speakers; and that there are significant problems with translation and interpretation
from English to Spanish.262 There is no indication that the results of this study will
lead to future amendments to the CARD Act designed to ameliorate these
problems.
Immigrant Latinos often fall into credit card debt due to obligations to
send remittances to family members in their home countries. 263 At least 35% of
remittance senders have a household income under $20,000 a year and send 15%
of their earnings to their country of origin. 264 Their ability to do this often reflects a
choice to prioritize remittances over paying their own bills, thereby increasing
their credit card debt.265 Finally, alarming health disparities between African
Americans, Latinos, and whites create a greater likelihood of medical emergencies
in African-American and Latino households that necessitate borrowing.266
mundo" and in 2008 replaced its spot television ads with $40,000 worth of magazine ads.
Id. In 2008, many previous advertisers such as American Express, U.S. Bank, Capital One,
Discover, Wells Fargo Bank, PNC Bank, Poder, and AmigoMoney, disappeared from the
market, id., presumably in response to financial constraints caused by the recession.
259. RAUL GONZALEZ, NAT'L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, LATINO CREDIT CARD USE:
OVERCOMING DISPARITIES, STRUCTURAL CHALLENGES, AND HARMFUL INDUSTRY PRACTICES
5 (2007), available at http://archives.financialservices.house.gov/hearinglI0/gonzalez.pdf.
260. 14.3% of Latinos are fraud victims compared to 6.4% of whites. KEITH B.
ANDERSON, FED. TRADE COMM'N, CONSUMER FRAUD IN THE UNITED STATES: AN FTC
SURVEY ES-4 to ES-8 & fig. ES-2 (2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/consumer
fraud/040805confraudrpt.pdf.
261. CARD Act, supra note 35, § 513.
262. GAO REPORT, supra note 140, at 8-11.
263. Undocumented immigrants, however, face barriers to entering the financial
system, such as the lack of a social security number, which force them to deal only in cash.
264. Ezra Rosser, Immigrant Remittances, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1, 11-13, 19 (2008).
265. Id. at 20.
266. For example, Latinas and black women have the highest rates of cervical
cancer, Cervical Cancer Rates by Race and Ethnicity, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL,
http://www.cdc.gov/cancer/cervical/statistics/race.htm (last updated Dec. 19, 2012), black
men have the highest incident rate of and are more likely to die from prostate cancer than
any other group, Prostate Cancer Rates by Race and Ethnicity, CENTER FOR DISEASE
CONTROL, http://www.cdc.gov/cancer/prostate/statistics/race.htm (last updated Dec. 19,
2012); and have the highest rates of lung cancer, Lung Cancer Rates by Race and Ethnicity,
CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, http://www.cdc.gov/cancer/lung/statistics/race.htm (last
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B. Proposed Amendments to the CARD Act
The following proposals for amendments to the CARD Act would
facilitate oversight of the industry's predatory practices by increasing
transparency, imposing reasonable restrictions on the companies, and financially
strengthening the communities harmed by these practices.
1. Require Industry Disclosures
Extensive disclosures by financial institutions, such as those required by
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") of publicly traded companies,
constitute an important part of financial regulation that the credit card industry
267presently lacks. The ability of credit card companies to hide their practices
enables their focus on profit at a high social cost. 268 It allows them to offer
different cards to different consumers based purely on zip code, name, or
ethnicity. 269 It lets the companies require substantial proof of financial stability
from African Americans to receive the same cards that whites receive with
minimal documentation. 270 It also keeps secret a number of industry practices: how
statistical models help identify low-income neighborhoods to target with
preapproved offers of cards with unreasonable terms;7n the exact amount of profit
generated from the lowest-income consumers; the number of card applications
from African Americans and Latinos rejected without sufficient justification; 272 the
data underlying market segmentation; and the methods used to determine the price
points of a vast array of cards.
The CARD Act should require all credit card companies to make a full
accounting of their products and processes. The CFPB should oversee these
updated Dec. 19, 2012). Black women have higher rates of high blood pressure, high
cholesterol, and diabetes than white women, and, according to the American Heart
Association, a significantly greater percentage of African-American men and women than
whites suffer from heart disease, Heart Disease, Race, and Ethnicity, LIFEHEART.COM,
http://www.lifeheart.com/patient/anginalethnicity.asp (last updated June 1, 2009). Some of
these disparities may be attributable to credit card use. See Manoj Thomas et al., How
Credit Card Payments Increase Unhealthy Food Purchases: Visceral Regulation of Vices,
38 J. CONSUMER RES. 126 (2011), available at http://www.jstor.org/pss/10.1086/657331;
see also Kevin Outterson, Tragedy & Remedy: Reparations for Disparities in Black Health,
9 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 735, 735-92 (2005); VERNELLIA R. RANDALL, DYING WHILE
BLACK (2006).
267. The SEC does not presently require disclosure by financial institutions of
credit card pricing or profits. It has recently, however, sought to expand disclosure
requirements for short-term borrowing, which could indicate a move in the direction of
greater supervision over credit card practices. See Proposed Rule for Short-Term Borrowing
Disclosure, 75 Fed. Reg. 59866 (proposed Sept. 17, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
229 & 249), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2010/33 -9143fr.pdf.
268. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 18, at 56-69.
269. See, e.g., Cohen-Cole, supra note 33.
270. See Lin, supra note 33, at 46.
271. Mann, supra note 61, at 6, 8.
272. See Lin, supra note 33.
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273disclosures, in line with its commitment to fairness in the industry. These
disclosures would allow for the calculation of reasonable usury rates and
regulation of exploitative practices.
2. Reinstate Usury Laws and Regulate Exploitative Practices
The CARD Act should impose restrictions on the amount of interest and
fees that a credit card company can charge. Rates and charges should relate to
costs and risks. Additionally, the CARD Act should regulate deceptive and
manipulative practices, such as teaser rates, mass mailings of preapproved cards,
and fee-harvesting cards. These regulations would be similar to existing
prohibitions on universal default and the previous practice of charging late fees as
of 2 p.m., instead of 5 p.m., on a bill's due date.
Usury laws prohibit money lending at unreasonably high interest rates.
They have protected consumers from exploitation for centuries, and their recent
unpopularity in the United States reflects the power of big banks and corporations
over individual consumers and government. 274 Cass Sunstein, ordinarily an
advocate of choice architecture, favoring default provisions over "paternalistic"
law-making,275 concedes that, in the credit card market, "prohibitions on voluntary
agreements might be justified."276 He describes the "very structure of [the credit
card] market" as one that "lead[s] many companies to appeal to bounded
rationality, rather than to attempt to counteract it." 2 7 Sunstein describes the market
273. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, American Express Says It Will Refund $85
Million, NY TIMES, Oct. 1, 2012, at B 1; Tyler Kingkade, CFPB Launching Investigation of
College Debit Cards, Financial Products Marketed to Students, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 31,
2013, 2:14 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/3 1/cfpb-college-debit-
cards n_2590611.htm.
274. For an account of the long history of usury laws, see Timothy A. Canova,
The Transformation of U.S. Banking and Finance: From Regulated Competition to Free-
Market Receivership, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 1295, 1336 n.136 (1995).
For many centuries, lending at high interest rates has been considered
morally indefensible, violating religious dictates and the laws of civil
society. See, e.g., THE BIBLE: Exod. 22:25; Neh. 5:7; Prov. 28:8; Lev.
25:36; Ps. 15:5; Ezek. 18:08, 18:13, 18:17, 22:12; Matt. 6:12, 18:27,
18:30, 18:32; see also THE KORAN (N.J. Dagwood trans., 4th ed. 1974):
Sura 11:276, 111:130, XXX:39; THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 29 (Ernest
Barker trans., 1978). In acknowledging the primary purpose of money
"as a means of exchange" Aristotle also recognized that "usury" (the
charging of interest) tries to make money increase as though it were an
end in itself. "The trade of the petty usurer," said Aristotle, "is hated
most, and with most reason: it makes a profit from currency itself,
instead of making it from the process (i.e. of exchange) which currency
was meant to serve." Id. at 28-29.
Id.
275. See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2009).
276. Sunstein, supra note 25, at 267.
277. Id. Bounded rationality in the credit card context refers to excessive
borrowing that leads to financial distress.
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as a "perverse system of redistribution, from less wealthy people who maintain
debt to relatively wealthy people who pay on time." He therefore asserts that
usury laws, a form of strong paternalism, might be appropriate in this context
because of their potential to restructure the credit card pricing system for
consumers' benefit.279
Sunstein's analysis focuses on the work of behavioral economists, but
other prominent financial scholars have recognized the necessity of applying
redistribution principles to credit regulation. In their paper successfully arguing for
a consumer financial protection agency, Elizabeth Warren and Oren Bar-Gill
decried the disadvantages experienced by African Americans, Latinos, and women
in the credit market and acknowledged that previous legislation had likely
benefited only well-educated, affluent borrowers. 280 To protect all credit
consumers, an amendment to the CARD Act should reinstate federal usury laws
that preempt permissive state laws. The definition of interest rates for this purpose
should include fees.
Amendments to the CARD Act should either abolish or severely restrict
teaser rates. Although a small number of consumers benefit from teaser rates by
borrowing at the low introductory rates and either paying off or transferring their
balances in the initial six-month period, most do not. 28 1 Even if they did, the
question remains whether there is positive social value in a card that is profitable
only when misused by the consumer. Mann asserts that, to ban these rates,
policymakers must view borrowing on a credit card as an exercise that a consumer
cannot or will not evaluate adequately. Alternatively, he advocates a ban if the
practice imposes external social harms.282 Both of these conditions apply to
borrowing based on teaser rates. Cognitive processes make accurate assessment of
one's own borrowing conduct extremely difficult, and the crises that result from
the imposition of high interest rates and associated fees on subsistence users create
high social costs. The prohibition of teaser rates thus satisfies Mann's tests.
Additionally, amendments to the CARD Act should ban mass mailings of
preapproved cards with exploitative terms to consumers living in red-lined
zones. 283 Credit card companies in the United States generate more than two-thirds
of their new accounts through mass mailings.284 Recognizing their potential harm,
amendments to the Fair Credit Reporting Act in 1996 created a process by which
278. Id. at 269
279. Id. at 267-69.
280. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 18, at 64-69.
281. See Bar-Gill, supra note 9, at 1392-93.
282. Ronald J. Mann, Unsafe at Any Price?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA
167, 173-74 (2009).
283. These consumers receive offers for the worst cards. See supra Part III.A.
284. See Littwin, supra note 22, at 484.
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consumers could opt out of these mailings.2 85 Information about the ability to opt
286
out, however, has largely failed to reach consumers.
Angela Littwin suggests substituting an opt-in system for the present opt-
out one to protect vulnerable consumers from temptation. She cautions, however,
that a shift away from preapproved offers could "devastate" the industry.287 The
process of applying for a credit card allows consumers to engage in at least some
level of forethought regarding the consequences of acquiring a card and facilitates
card-shopping or attempts to negotiate rates, fees, and terms. Additionally, it is
unclear that any consumers benefit from preapproved cards in light of their
disadvantageous terms. Instead, therefore, of attempting to immunize the industry
from financial harm at consumers' expense, regulation should protect consumers
and allow the market to adjust if necessary.
3. Require Banks to Create Individual Development Accounts
The CARD Act should mandate the creation of matched savings accounts
in the form of individual development accounts ("IDAs") for low-income
individuals by credit card-issuing banks. IDAs are a form of asset-based policy
designed to allow people to get ahead instead of merely getting by, as income-
based policies do.2 IDA savings typically go toward home ownership, education,
small business capitalization, and occasionally to the purchase of vehicles or
computers. 289 IDA participants must attend both general and asset-specific
financial education classes. 90 The benefits of IDAs adhere both to their recipients
and the banks that provide them.
Asset-based policy directed at the poor is necessary because, although the
U.S. government currently spends more than $300 billion a year on asset-based
benefits, more than 90% of these subsidies go to people in the upper half of the
income distribution. 291 Experiments with IDAs demonstrate that low-income
individuals also can and do save under the right institutional structures and
conditions, refuting behavioral economists' assertions that the inability to save
285. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (2012).
286. For a thorough explanation of how the system works, or does not work, see
Littwin, supra note 22, at 481-84.
287. Id. at 484.
288. Michael Sherraden, Individual Development Accounts and Asset Building
Policy, in INSUFFICIENT FUNDs SAVINGS, ASSETS, CREDIT, AND BANKING AMONG Low-
INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 191, 192 (2009).
289. Id. at 193.
290. Id. Studies of existing programs indicate that ten hours of financial education
positively affect saving performance. Id. at 200.
291. Sherraden, supra note 288, at 192; see also CHRISTOPHER HOwARD, THE
HIDDEN WELFARE STATE: TAx EXPENDITURES AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 31,
250 (1997) (explaining that asset-based benefits tend to go to workers in "larger companies,
unionized industries, and better paying occupations," thereby disproportionally benefiting
more affluent families and individuals).
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derives entirely from individual capacities and virtues.292 For example, in one
study group, IDA account holders had $5,892 more in real assets and had $6,181
more in total assets than the control group of individuals without IDAs.293 The
researchers noted that "[a]lthough the significance level is small, the differences in
the values of real assets and total assets are meaningful, especially for a low-
income population." 294 A study also revealed that the positive impact on
homeownership for African Americans in IDA programs exceeded that for IDA
295participants as a group.
296Most IDA funding currently comes from the government. Additionally,
297
some banks, particularly in the South, have set up IDAs for eligible customers.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") encourages banks to create
IDAs as "a relatively low-risk way ... to introduce underbanked individuals to the
financial mainstream" and "help banks tap into new markets." 298 Instead of
encouraging banks to provide low-income individuals with IDAs, the government
should make their creation obligatory.
Pilot IDA programs have encountered obstacles due to high
administrative costs. 299 Banks are in the best position to bear these costs and may,
in fact, benefit from their investment in the ways described by the FDIC. More
importantly, the introduction of IDAs on a massive scale has the potential to create
class mobility for some of their participants.
4. Implement Subsistence Amnesty
The temporary suspension of fees and interest on credit card subsistence
purchases made by poor consumers-or subsistence amnesty-would represent a
292. Id. at 198-200. One salient example of increased saving based on structural
factors is the change in participation in 401(k) plans that go from an opt-in to an opt-out
format. One study demonstrated a rise in participation for women from 35% to 86%, for
Latinos from 19% to 75%, and for people earning under $20,000 a year from 13% to 80%.
Id. at 199.
293. See Chang Kuen-Han et al., Assets Beyond Saving in Individual Development
Accounts 15-17 (Wash. Univ. in St. Louis, Ctr. for Soc. Dev., Working Paper No. 07-25,
2007), available at http://www.usc.edu/dept/chepa/IDApays/publications/assets%20beyond
%201DA.pdf Documents/WPO7-25.pdf (reporting that IDA participants had more real and
total assets than members of a control group without such accounts).
294. Id.
295. Sherraden, supra note 288, at 202. IDA participants significantly increased
their rate of home ownership by five percentage points, from six to 11. Id.
296. Id. at 193.
297. Some examples of these are the Good Faith Fund, Southern Development
Bank Corporation; the South Carolina Association of Community Development
Corporations; the North Carolina IDA and Asset Building Collaborative; the Economic
Opportunity Agency of Washington County, Ark.; the Greater New Orleans IDA
Collaborative; and United Way of Metropolitan Atlanta IDA program. ScoTT DORON &
ELAINE RIDEOUT FISHER, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: AN ISSUE FOR THE SOUTH 8-11
(2002), available at http://www.southemgrowth. com/pubs/pubs.pdfs/pp0402_wealth.pdf.
298. Sherraden, supra note 288, at 204 (quoting Chairperson Sheila C. Bair).
299. See id. at 209.
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significant step toward reducing the exploitation of low-income credit card users.
Subsistence amnesty would increase the amount of disposable income available to
poor households. This amnesty would also increase market efficiency by
compelling the credit card companies to adjust their fees and interest rates to
reflect risk instead of the potential to generate profit.
The massive redistribution of wealth from the poor to the banks that has
already occurred requires a corresponding shift of funds flowing back from the
credit card companies to poor consumers. To level the playing field to some degree
between corporations and low-income consumers, the CARD Act should require
credit card companies to treat subsistence purchases by poor cardholders
differently from other purchases. The CARD Act should identify items that it
deems necessary for subsistence, such as non-luxury food items, gasoline, diapers,
electricity bills, and toiletries. This type of categorization already exists in the
context of taxation, where certain items are subject to sales tax and others that the
government identifies as essentials, such as food and prescription drugs, are not.3oo
These existing exemptions are very specific. For example, in Utah, food sold on
the shelves of grocery stores is exempt from sales tax, but food purchased from the
same store's deli counter is not. 3 0 1 In North Dakota, food is generally exempt from
sales tax, but not fruit juices containing less than fifty percent juice, carbonated
beverages, candy, or food purchased for consumption on or near the premises
where it was sold.302 This system can serve as a model for dividing products into
subsistence and non-subsistence items. Subsistence purchases would appear on a
separate section of the credit card bill, and the credit used to acquire them would
not be subject to interest or late fees. Any other purchases would be treated as
described in the credit card agreement.
In 2010, the U.S. Census Bureau devised a new method of measuring
poverty, which it implemented for the first time in 201 1.303 The new measurement
takes into account receipt of government benefits, cost of living, taxes, child care
costs, and work expenses to arrive at a more accurate calculation of annual income
than the previous method.3 04 Under the new measurement, one-third of American
300. See, e.g., FED'N OF TAX ADM'RS, STATE SALES TAX RATES AND FOOD &
DRUG EXEMPTIONS (2013), available at http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/sales.pdf
(graphically showing that in a majority of states, food and prescription drugs are exempt
from sales tax); NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGS., TAX POLICY HANDBOOK FOR STATE
LEGISLATORS 7 (3d ed. 2010), available at http://www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal/TaxPolicy
Handbook3rdEdition.pdf (noting the policy of supporting low-income consumers by
exempting some necessities from taxation).
301. See UTAH STATE TAX COMM'N, UTAH! SALES AND USE TAX GENERAL
INFORMATION (2012), available at, http://tax.utah.gov/forms/pubs/pub-25.pdf
302. CORY FONG, N.D. OFFICE OF STATE TAX COMM'R, SALES TAX EXEMPTIONS
GUIDELINE 2 (2006), available at http://www.nd.gov/tax/salesanduse/pubs/guide/gl-2181
4.pdf
303. See Pam Fessler, New Measure Shows Higher Poverty Rate in U.S., NPR
(Nov. 7, 2011, 5:15 PM), http://www.npr.org/2011/11/07/142105558/new-measure-shows-
higher-poverty-rate-in-u-s.
304. Sabrina Tavemise & Robert Gebeloff, Poverty Gets New Measure at Census
Bureau, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2011, at A17.
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households subsisted below the poverty line of $24,343 annual income for a family
of four in 2010.305 Subsistence amnesty should apply to all households and
individuals who fall under the poverty line based on this formula. Regular and
frequent re-evaluation of the amnesty by the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau would ensure that it stays in place only as long as needed.
Special protection for a specific group of credit consumers is not without
precedent. For example, the 2007 John Warner National Defense Authorization
Act imposed a 36% annual interest rate cap on certain types of consumer loans to
military borrowers. 306 This amendment to the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act
came in the wake of scholarly arguments in favor of enhanced protection from
predatory lending for military personnel. 307 Legal scholars have also made
persuasive arguments for regulation to protect vulnerable populations, such as
students and the elderly, from abuses by the credit card industry, and to eliminate
barriers to credit for ex-felons.308 The CARD Act responded to concerns about
student borrowing by implementing restrictions on credit card agreements with
students. 309 The protection afforded by subsistence amnesty would benefit many
individuals in these groups already identified as vulnerable.
a. Challenges
The strongest objection to subsistence amnesty from the left is a fear of
the unintended consequence of removing or restricting access to credit cards for
low-income consumers, leaving them less equipped to deal with emergencies,
juggle finances, and fully participate in society. This concern also arises in
connection with some scholars' advocacy of a return to a system where only low-
risk consumers receive credit. 310 Littwin offers a response to this contention. Based
on her study of credit use by low-income women, Littwin contends that restricting
credit cards to middle- and high-income consumers might have positive net effects
305. Id.
306. Talent Amendment to the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 109-
364, § 670, 120 Stat. 2083, 2266 (2006) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 987(b)).
307. See, e.g., Steven M. Graves & Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Lending
and the Military: The Law and Geography of "Payday" Loans in Military Towns, 66 OHIO
ST. L.J. 653 (2005).
308. See Donna S. Harkness, When Over the Limit is Over the Top: Addressing
the Adverse Impact of Unconscionable Consumer-Credit Practices on the Elderly, 16
ELDER L.J. 1 (2008); Taja-Nia Y. Henderson, New Frontiers in Fair Lending: Confronting
Lending Discrimination Against Ex-Offenders, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1237 (2005); Nelson,
supra note 136.
309. See CARD Act, supra note 35, §§ 304-305.
310. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 136, at 33-34; LAUREN K. SAUNDERS, NAT'L
CONSUMER LAW CTR., BEYOND THE CREDIT CARD ACT: FEATURES OF SAFER CREDIT CARD
7 (2010), available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/creditcards/features-safer-credit-
card.pdf ("No credit should be granted if the consumer cannot handle additional
obligations.").
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for poor consumers. These consumers already rely on a variety of formal and
informal sources of credit but find credit cards to be the most harmful.'
Low-income consumers, however, have come to depend on credit cards
and appreciate the significant benefits that they offer; such as anonymity; social
status; and privileges, including car rental, hotel reservations, and the purchase of
airline tickets. The credit card companies created this reliance through targeted
preapproved mailings, marketing, and advertising, and would likely fight
aggressively to keep their most profitable consumers, despite risk of default. A
middle ground exists. The companies can continue to profit from lending to low-
income consumers, even if the profits are not excessive. Most cardholders pay
money on their credit cards every month.312 Even if these small payments went in
part to the loan principal, the credit card companies still stand to gain from these
relationships.
The technology that has enabled the top issuers to predict the profit
potential of low-income, high-risk consumers will facilitate strategic shifts,
including product adjustment and alternative profit sources, in addition to the
maintenance of a portfolio of low-income consumers. 313 It is therefore more likely
that the companies would revise their business models to compensate for a
reduction in profit from regulatory measures designed to protect low-income
consumers, including a temporary subsistence amnesty, rather than abandon these
customers altogether.
A major objection to subsistence amnesty from the right is moral hazard.
This is the fear that eligible consumers would take advantage of the law to use
other sources of income to make luxury purchases, while reserving credit cards for
subsistence purchases, thereby "cheating" the companies out of their rightful
profits. At the root of this objection is a belief that poor people do not deserve
luxuries or even opportunities, as the money freed by the amnesty could go to
investments in education or entrepreneurship that would hasten a household's
journey out of poverty.314 Most likely, the extra money would go to both.
The money that poor people presently owe credit card companies derives
not from a calculation of the actual risk of default associated with their loans but
from an assessment of the amount companies can charge in fees and interest
without pushing their customers into bankruptcy.3 1s Subsistence users pay
significant portions of their overall income to credit card companies, receiving
nothing in return. Subsistence amnesty would therefore represent the rightful
return of money to the subsistence user. What the user chooses to do with that
money upon its retrieval is irrelevant to an assessment of the potential value of
subsistence amnesty.
311. See Littwin, supra note 28, at 444.
312. See DAVID K. SHIPLER, THE WORKING POOR (2004).
313. See Mann, supra note 11.
314. See Andrea Freeman, Credit Card Ills: Reducing Racial Disparities in Debt
60-62 (2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://works.bepress.com/andrea
freeman/2/.
315. See Mann, supra note 11.
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Poor people deserve luxuries as much as middle- and high-income
individuals do. Poverty results from social stratification and unequal distribution,
social forces beyond individuals' control. It is fundamental to human dignity that
316people should be able to spend their money as they wish. Luxury purchases,
from electronics to chocolate, reflect a "basic human need for a pleasant e317
Thus, poor people may reasonably choose to go without food to afford the
purchase of a television that relieves some of the boredom of isolation and
unemployment, or a cell phone that maintains their participation in a social
network and eligibility for job opportunities.
Moral hazard exists in any social welfare system, including food stamps,
social security, and welfare. This danger, however, does not outweigh the benefits
of these programs. It is therefore simply a necessary evil that society chooses to
tolerate in order to give concrete assistance to those who need it most.
From a market perspective, subsistence amnesty would trigger immediate
adjustment on the sellers' side. The elimination of exploitative interest rates and
fees would lead to a more efficient market, where sellers compete to offer products
that meet consumers' needs. It would also alleviate the social costs of the
industry's predatory practices by pushing those costs back on to the companies
responsible for them.
Irrespective of its advantages, subsistence amnesty would face great
resistance from the credit card companies, which protect their interests through
aggressive lobbying and close personal and financial ties between banks and
politicians. Visa, MasterCard, and American Express each donated more than $1
million to federal candidates in the 2010 elections. 319 Lobbyists paid politicians
more than $300,000 before and after the vote on the CARD Act.32 This lobbying
appears to have been effective, as the CARD Act ultimately left the industry and
its profits basically intact.321 Additionally, after initially envisioning a strong role
316. For a discussion of human dignity as an essential legal principle, see Rhonda
V. Magee Andrews, The Third Reconstruction: An Alternative to Race Consciousness and
Colorblindness in Post-Slavery America, 54 ALA. L. REv. 483, 533-44 (2003).
317. BANERJEE & DUFLO, supra note 168, at 37-38 (asserting that indulgences are
"not the impulsive purchases of people who are not thinking hard about what they are
doing. They are carefully thought out, and reflect strong compulsions, whether internally
driven or externally imposed.").
318. Id.
319. Sarah Bryner, The Credit Card Lobby, Wal-Mart's Politicking and More in
Capital Eye Opener, OPENSECRETS.ORG (April 13, 2011, 12:20 PM),
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/04/the-credit-card-lobby-wal-marts-pol.html.
320. Kim Zetter, Bank Lobbyists Paid Nearly $300, 000 to Politicians Before and
After Vote on Credit Card Bill, WIRED (Aug. 26, 2009), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/
/08/bank-lobbyists/.
321. See CFPB Report, supra note 78, at 12. In spite of early reported losses by
banks, consumers have not reduced their payments to credit card companies since the Act
took effect.
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for the CFPB,322 the Obama administration abandoned a key proposed provision
requiring banks to offer low-interest, low-fee credit cards. 323 The tendency of high-
profile individuals to revolve positions between industry and government also
324guarantees the prioritization of corporate interests over consumer protection.
Nonetheless, the extreme pressures of the ongoing financial crisis may
well lead to public demand for stronger regulation. Consumers demonstrated the
strength of their feelings about banks' practices through a massive consumer
activist initiative in reaction to a proposed imposition of a $5 fee on debit card use
by Bank of America, among other banks, in the fall of 201 1.325 Opponents of the
fee declared November 5, 2011, Bank Transfer Day and encouraged consumers,
via social media, to move their funds out of major banks and into credit unions. 326
The campaign was a success.327 In response to the protests, Bank of America
canceled the fee, although it and its competitors continue to impose new, less
visible fees on consumers. 328
The Occupy Wall Street movement mobilized thousands of people
against economic inequality across the country. By providing a more extreme end
of the spectrum of protest, Occupy Wall Street made room for a broader range of
innovative solutions to the credit crisis. Occupy Wall Street also tackled the
problem of consumer debt directly with a debt cancellation program called Rolling
Jubilee.329 In this program, the organization buys consumer debt from the banks
322. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, tit. X, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (establishing the Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection).
323. Jim Puzzanghera, Reform Plan Is Likely to Get Rewrite, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
24, 2009, at BI.
324. Examples include Donald Regan, who went from Goldman Sachs to being
Treasury Secretary under Ronald Reagan; Robert Rubin, who went from Goldman Sachs to
being Treasury Secretary under Clinton and then to Citigroup; Henry Paulson, who went
from being Goldman Sachs' CEO to being Treasury Secretary under George W. Bush;
Timothy Geithner, former New York Federal Reserve Bank President, who succeeded
Paulson under Barack Obama; and Mark Patterson, former Goldman Sachs lobbyist became
Geithner's Deputy Secretary. Kathleen McCarthy, "Inside Job ": A Wall Street Government,
RIVER CITY'S READER (Mar. 30, 2011), http://www.rcreader.com/commentary/inside-job-
wall-street-government/ (reviewing the film Inside Job, a documentary about the financial
crisis).
325. Pallavi Gogoi, Bank Fees Quietly Coming Back After Backlash, HUFFINGTON
POST (Mar. 1, 2012, 8:42 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012 /03/02/bank-
fees n 1315828.html.
326. See Bank Transfer Day, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/Nov.Fifth
(last visited Jan. 17, 2013).
327. See Suzanne Kapner, Credit Unions Poach Clients, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 7,
2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203733504577021972358085822.
html.
328. Eric Dash, Banks Quietly Ramping Up Costs to Consumers, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 14, 2011, at Al.
329. See, e.g., Charles Eisenstein, Comment, Why Occupy's Plan to Cancel
Consumer Debts Is Money Well Spent, GUARDIAN (Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.guardian.uk/
commentisfree/2012/nov/12/occupy-plan-cancel-consumer-debt; Catherine New, Rolling
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for the same price that debt consolidation companies do, then cancels the debt.
Social justice organizations and individuals care about what banks do, and this
recognized stake in their practices may eventually lead to innovative financial
regulation.
CONCLUSION
Credit card debt restricts the financial and social freedom of an increasing
number of individuals. It precludes self-improvement through entrepreneurship
and education and leads to debilitating states of depression and despair. It also
serves to discipline a significant portion of the population, encouraging people to
keep their heads down and work without protest. 30
It is a testament to the power of the credit card companies that, in a time
of protest against income inequality in general and outrage against exploitation and
discrimination in the mortgage lending industry, the structure of the credit card
industry remains relatively unchallenged. A shift in public opinion is a necessary
catalyst to systemic reform. Going forward, scholars, policymakers, and
economists with the objective of solving the credit card problem must include
structural analysis in their work. Without it, changes will be piecemeal and
ultimately beneficial only to the most powerful financial constituents, the
institutions who created and continue to perpetuate the problem. "[I]n any
consideration of debt, the concept of the balance is pivotal: Debtor and creditor are
two sides of a single entity, one cannot exist without the other, and exchanges
between them-in a healthy economy or society or ecosystem-tend toward
equilibrium."m3 '
Jubilee Offshoot of Occupy Wall Street to Offer Debtors $1 Million Bailout, HUFFINGTON
PosT (Nov. 12, 2012, 6:39 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/1 1/12/jubilee-
occupy-wall-street n_2117792.html.
330. For a fascinating exploration of this role of debt in society, see Tayyab
Mahmud, Debt and Discipline: Neoliberal Political Economy and the Working Class, 101
Ky. L.J. 1 (2012).
331. MARGARET ATWOOD, PAYBACK: DEBT AND THE SHADOW SIDE OF WEALTH
163 (2008).
